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1  1991 editorial by Johnny Noxema and Rex Boy in the Toronto zine Bimbox, quoted in
Dennis Cooper, “Queercore,” 292, in The Material Queer: A LesBiGay Cultural Studies Reader,
ed. Donald Morton (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996).
2  Special thanks to Mary Anne Case, Joshua Cohen, Elizabeth Emens, Janet Halley,
Derek Jinks, Martha Nussbaum, Toni Massaro, Richard Posner, Mia Ruyter, James Spindler, and
Cass Sunstein for comments, criticism, and guidance; and to Ranjit Hakim, Kate Levine and
Aaron Simowitz for exceptional research assistance.
3  123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (upholding a substantive due process challenge to Texas’
criminal statute banning homosexual “deviate sexual intercourse,” where “deviate sexual
intercourse” is defined as oral sex, anal sex, or penetration with an object of the genitals or the
anus of another person). 
4  I use these terms—“supermajoritarian” and “conventionally deviant conduct”— in a
positivist sense.  According to a survey poll based on telephone interviews with 1,000 adult
Texans conducted between August 7 and August 21, 2003, on behalf of the Star-Telegram and
other media organizations by the Scripps Howard polling agency, 70 percent of Texan
respondents believe that homosexual behavior is morally wrong compared to 17 percent who feel
that it is not morally improper.  See Dave Montgomery, “Most Texans say gay marriages are
wrong,” The Star-Telegram, September 5, 2003 (available at
http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/nation/6698373.htm) (a similar poll conducted in Texas in
1999 showed a breakdown of 68 percent morally opposed versus 18 percent not morally
opposed).  Moreover, male homosexual anal intercourse—the specific conduct charged in
Lawrence—traditionally has been viewed as conventionally deviant in Texas and under common
law.  In 1868, most state penal codes, including the Texas criminal code, criminalized the “crime
against nature” and “followed the English decisions defining the crime as involving penetration
by a male penis inside the rectum of an animal, a woman or girl, or another man or a boy.”  Brief
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“You are entering a gay and lesbian-free zone”1:
On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers.
[Raising Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law]
Bernard E. Harcourt2
The most renown substantive criminal law decision of the October 2002 Term, Lawrence v.
Texas,3 will go down in history as a critical turning point in criminal law debates over the proper
scope of the penal sanction.  For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United
States Supreme Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide
a rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct.4  The court’s ruling is the coup de
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of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas at p. 9.
5  The leading variation in the criminal law is, naturally, the harm principle.  For a
discussion tracing the rise and triumph of the harm principle in criminal law, see generally
Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109 (1999) (tracing
the rise of the harm principle and suggesting that the triumph of the harm principle over legal
moralism paradoxically has eviscerated the limiting principle of harm); see also Harcourt,
Illusion of Order, chap. 7 (2001).
6  478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
7  Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483 (quoting Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Bowers).
8  The pomp and circumstance resonates loudly in the majority’s pronouncement
following the block quote from Justice Stevens’ Bowers dissent.  With all the formality
appropriate to the coronation of a new monarch following a coup d’état, the court declares:
Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in
Bowers and should control here.  
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It
ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.  
grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle
against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.5  Henceforth—or at least until
further notice—majoritarian morality no longer automatically trumps liberal argument (whether
consequentialist or deontological) in defining the reasonable and permissible contours of the penal
code.  Justice Byron White’s infamous declaration in Bowers v. Hardwick that the criminal law is
constantly and may  properly be “based on notions of morality”6 no longer stands.  Instead, Justice
John Paul Stevens’ contrary statement from his dissent in Bowers is elevated, in block quote, to
supreme law of the land:  “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.”7  With much pomp and circumstance, the majority in Lawrence inters legal moralism and
crowns liberal legalism.8  As a matter of federal due process, courts reviewing penal legislation must
now deploy some other principle to distinguish between permissible and impermissible majoritarian
moral opprobrium. 
What that other principle will consist of is not clear.  Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for
the majority in Lawrence offers a dizzying array of possibilities, ranging from the watered-down
harm principle of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, to evolving standards of morality
as reflected in the history of state legislative enactments (and repeal) of sodomy provisions, to the
critical commentary of reputedly conservative American academic judges such as Charles Fried and
Richard Posner, to international law decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, to the 1957
British Wolfenden Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, to the Romer
v. Evans equal protection anti-animosity principle, to state judicial resistance to the Bowers ruling,
to conceptions of privacy, notions of dignity, or what Cass Sunstein refers to as “an American
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9  Cass Sunstein argues on grounds of judicial prudence for a narrow reading of Lawrence
that stresses this last possibility—the idea that “a criminal ban on sodomy is hopelessly out of
accord with contemporary convictions.”  See Cass Sunstein, “What Did Lawrence Hold?  Of
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage,” Supreme Court Review (forthcoming 2004).
10  See Mary Anne Case, “On ‘This’ and ‘That’ in Lawrence v. Texas,” Supreme Court
Review (forthcoming 2004).  
11  123 S.Ct. at 2497.
12  123 S.Ct. at 2496.  Scalia defines the “homosexual agenda” as “the agenda promoted
by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally
attached to homosexual conduct.”  Id.  
13  “Scalia ridicules court’s gay sex ruling, ‘liberal political order,’” USAToday, posted
October 24, 2003 (available at http://abcnews.go.com/wire/Politics/ap20031023_2301.html).
version of desuetude.”9  The result is a rhetorical smorgasbord of legal authority, a judicial mélange
of bibliographic references.  As Mary Anne Case observes, the Lawrence opinion points to a “this”
and “that” of ambiguous referents—it is, in Case’s words, an opinion that “starts its readers off with
this and in the end may deliver that instead.”10  
Justice Kennedy’s pastiche in Lawrence is, at a legal theoretical level, incoherent and under
normal circumstances—in many other cases—would be internally contradictory.  As a jurisprudential
matter, utilitarian welfare maximizing or harm calculations are anathema to a deontological human
rights paradigm, which in turn is in tension with jurisdictional bean-counting.  These different rules
of decision have little in common except, of course, when they converge on the same result, which
is apparently the case here—or at least, it is the case for decriminalizing homosexual sodomy.  The
theoretical incoherence and rhetorical overkill of Justice Kennedy’s opinion lends credence to Justice
Antonin Scalia’s incendiary dissent in Lawrence, specifically to the idea that the majority’s holding
is no technical knock-out victory for liberal legalism, but rather a politically or culturally partisan
decision.  
To Justice Scalia, the majority in Lawrence simply took sides in our contemporary culture
wars over the sexual and moral fabric of American society.  The Lawrence ruling, Scalia declares,
is a partisan outcome that aligns the court with the pro-gay faction in large part because of a law
profession that is biased in favor of gay men and lesbian women.  “It is clear from this [decision] that
the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer,
that the democratic rules of engagement are observed,” Scalia writes.11  “Today’s opinion is the
product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the
so-called homosexual agenda. . .”12  These are fighting words—a battle cry, a call to arms in our
contemporary culture wars—and according to the Associated Press, Justice Scalia has continued to
wage war outside the courthouse.  Several months after the Lawrence decision, Justice Scalia
reportedly ridiculed the majority’s ruling in a speech to the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, reading
from Justice Kennedy’s opinion with “a mocking tone,” and deriding the majority for imposing, in
his words, “the latest academic understanding of liberal political theory.”13
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14  123 S.Ct. at 2497.
15  See Elizabeth F. Emens, “Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence,” 29 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change (forthcoming 2004).  
16  The practice of inserting a fist and forearm into the anus or vagina.
17  The practice among some men of engaging in unprotected same-gender anal sex or of
actively seeking to be infected with the HIV virus.  See text infra at ___.
18  For example, the femme/butch debates among lesbian women.  
19  The practice among some women of “the wearing of a dildo down the trouser leg to
suggest the existence of a penis.”  Sheila Jeffreys, Unpacking Queer Politics 1 (Cambridge UK:
Justice Scalia’s dissent is remarkably insightful—in certain respects prescient—in situating
the Lawrence decision in its proper social and political context, and it offers a useful heuristic to help
interpret the result.  The fact is, there is today a war of sexual projects that is being fought on
American soil, and the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, are inextricably
caught up in the ongoing battles.  But what is missing in Justice Scalia’s critique are the important
nuances and subtleties that shape these contemporary sex wars, that make them so fascinating and
so unpredictable—and that both resignify and ambiguate the purported gay victory in Lawrence. 
The heart of the problem is that Justice Scalia incorrectly models our contemporary culture
wars on two-sided military conflict—specifically on a war between, on the one hand, liberal
homosexual activists who are promoting a pro-gay-rights agenda and the law profession with its
“anti-anti-homosexual culture,” and, on the other hand, mainstream anti-homosexual attitudes
represented by those “many Americans [who] do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in
their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home.”14  This two-party model does not—and
cannot—begin to capture the complex social, political, and sexual dynamics of our contemporary
sex wars.  While it is true, of course, that everyone, if pushed to the limit, is either “for” or “against”
the legalization of homosexual relations—just as everyone, again if pushed to the limit, is either
“for” or “against” abortion, “for” or “against” the death penalty, “for” or “against” gun control—it
is necessary to focus not simply on the ultimate polarity but rather on the much wider range of sexual
projects in order to begin to understand the unexpected alliances, unanticipated tipping points, and
surprising truces that characterize our sex wars.  Instead of two-sided military conflict, the model
should approximate more fluid and shifting patterns of temporary equilibria in a continually
interrupted, jarred, and hence moving medium.
Our present sexual landscape in the United States—and in the West more generally—is
marked by a multiplicity of sexual projects, at times ambiguous and fluid, at other times rigid,
doctrinaire, even fascistic; sometimes overlapping or allied, at other times in tense conflict; some
militant and hard, others nurturing, warm, even embracing; some exclusionary, some missionary.
The battle lines are drawn not only over the sex of sexual partners—that’s the least of it—but over
multiple dimensions of promiscuity,  monogamy,15 child custody, sadomasochism, commitment,
“fisting,”16 public sex, female-to-male sex change operations (and male-to-female),  “barebacking”
and “bug chasing,”17 importuning, “role-playing,”18 “piercing” and “cutting,” “packing,”19
HARCOURT: OF LAWRENCE, SEX WARS, AND THE CRIM INAL LAW 5
Polity Press 2003).
20  “Fancying” is “attraction based simply on physical appearance” and triggered
significant debate as to whether it is objectifying, racist, “ableist,” and reflects “a construction of
sexuality which was hostile to women’s interests.”  Jeffreys, The Lesbian Heresy at xii.
21  Not to mention “post-queer” (younger more radical queers who are positioning
themselves in opposition to assimilationist queer politics), “breeder” (heterosexuals with
children, meant to connote that the child-bearing and child-raising capabilities of heterosexuals
are privileged over those of homosexual couples, see Cherry Smyth, Lesbians Talk Queer
Notions, 57 (London: Scarlet Press 1992)), 
22  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the Court holds
that this may amount to sex discrimination under Title VII on a theory of same-sex sexual
harassment.  
23  Janet Halley, “Sexuality Harassment,” in Left Legalism/Left Critique (Wendy Brown
and Janet Halley, eds.) (Duke University Press 2002).  
24  Janet Halley at 95.
25  Halley at 97.
26  See Jeffrey Toobin, “The Consent Defense,” New Yorker, Volume 79, no. 24, p. 40
(September 1, 2003), at p. 87.
“fancying,”20 marrying, childbearing, adopting, pornography, and sexual assault—to name just a few.
The very definitions of heterosexual, homosexual, bi-, trans-, poly-, metro-, pomo-sexual, lesbian,
queer—again, to name just a few—are fought over,21 even whether the labels themselves should be
abandoned.  The academy, the courts, the media and public sphere have witnessed an explosion of
sexual projects and related discourses of sexuality.
If a male worker on an all-man oil rig is held down by his fellow guy workers while they
deliberately put their penises up against his body, if he is threatened with same-sex rape, is he the
victim of sexual harassment under Title VII, as Justice Scalia writing for a unanimous court makes
possible in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,22 or should the lower federal court reread
the factual allegations in a manner that ambiguates sexual desire, as Janet Halley, professor at
Harvard Law School, ingeniously and provocatively suggests in Sexuality Harassment?23  Could it
be, as Halley writes, that the alleged victim in Oncale “performs a feminine man to signal his
willingness to be mastered,” that “the other guys comply with a big display of masculinity,” so that
“‘man fucks woman’ but with a twist that undoes the capacity of the male/female model to
underwrite [the plaintiff Oncale] as a victim”?24  Could it be, as Halley suggests, that in reality it is
the plaintiff alleging sexual harassment who may be attacking his fellow guy workers “by invoking
the remarkable powers of the federal court to restore his social position as heterosexual?”25  And
would we really want the average juror or Justice Scalia using their common sense to resolve these
questions?  (For the skeptical or unaccustomed reader, try mapping this on the rape allegations of
the concierge of the Lodge & Spa at Cordillera Colorado against NBA superstar Kobe Bryant, and
keep in mind that, shortly before Bryant’s appearance in court, a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll
revealed that 41 percent of white respondents and 68 percent of African-American respondents
believed her allegations probably untrue).26  Notice in the debate over Oncale how a gay-friendly
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27  Of course, even within the liberal pro-gay-rights position, there was and is still debate
about whether the extension of sexual harassment law to same-sex harassment is strategically
positive. [cites]
28  See Halley, “Sexuality Harassment” at 82. 
29  Sheila Jeffreys, Unpacking Queer Politics 102 (Cambridge UK: Polity Press 2003).
30  See generally John Preston, My Life as a Pornographer and Other Indecent Acts 17,
50, 59 (New York: Masquerade Books Inc. 1993).
31  Sheila Jeffreys, Unpacking Queer Politics 102 (Cambridge UK: Polity Press 2003).
32  Leo Bersani, “Foucault, Freud, fantasy and power,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and
Gay Studies, Vol. 2,, 11-33 (1995), at p. 19-20.
33  Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2496. 
34  Jeffreys (2003) at 2.
35  This is the legal question in Corbett v. Corbett, a British case from 1970. See [1971] P.
83, [1970] 2 All E. R. 33, [1970] 2 WLR 1306.  The case is notorious and has received a lot of
critical attention. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, “Transgenderism and Sexual Orientation: More Than
a Marriage or Convenience?,” 397, 400–403, in Queer Families, Queer Politics: Challenging
judicial opinion that has the potential of protecting gay men and lesbians from same-sex sexual
harassment, a decision supported by the liberal pro-gay-rights forces,27 a ruling that promotes the
“so-called homosexual agenda” and that is authored, ironically, by Justice Scalia himself, is attacked
as potentially encroaching on same-gender sexual advances and sexuality more generally from a gay-
friendly theoretic perspective that challenges the homosexual (as well as heterosexual) identity.28
If four men nail the heads of their penises to a butcher block with stainless steel needles while
being photographed by an editor of a gay newspaper, the Advocate, are they manifesting an unhealthy
psychotic internalization of their oppression as homosexual men, as Sheila Jeffreys, professor of
political science at the University of Melbourne suggests,29 or are they instead performing a valuable
and cathartic gay male initiation ritual that helps overcome the stigma of unmanliness associated
with gay male sex?30  Are they, in the words of Jeffreys, “act[ing] out upon their bodies the woman-
hating and gay-hating of the societies they inhabit”?31  Or are similar acts of sadomasochism, instead,
as Leo Bersani reports, “passionate, erotic, growthful, consensual, sometimes fearful, exorcism,
reclamation, joyful, intense, boundary-breaking, trust building, loving, unbelievably great sex, often
funny, creative, spiritual, integrating, a development of inner power as strength.”32  Within the gay-
friendly community—within the community of scholars and activists whose agenda is, in the words
of Justice Scalia, “directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to
homosexual conduct”33—where do we look for an answer to this question?  In gay male studies, in
queer theory, in lesbian feminist writings?  And is it really true, as Jeffreys contends, that “the
political agenda of queer politics is damaging to the interests of lesbians, women in general, and to
marginalized and vulnerable constituencies of gay men”?34
If a male transvestite marries a male-to-female transsexual who has undergone sexual-
reassignment surgery, is he entitled to an annulment of the marriage because his wife was a man and
has refused to consummate the marriage?35  Is homosexual public sex good or bad for gay politics?
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Culture and the State, eds. Mary Bernstein and Renate Reimann (New York: Columbia
University Press 2001); Katherine M. Franke, “The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender,” 144 U.Penn.L.Rev. 1 (1995) (discussing the Corbett
case). 
36  John Rechy, The Sexual Outlaw, 299 (London: Futura 1979).  For pro-public-sex
arguments, see Policing Public Sex, ed. Dangerous Bedfellows; Pat Califia, Public Sex: The
Culture of Radical Sex (Pittsburgh: Cleis Press, 1994).  For anti-public-sex arguments, see
generally Sheila Jeffreys, Unpacking Queer Politics at 57–77.
37  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Log Cabin Republicans; Amicus Curiae Brief of
Republican Unity Coalition.
38  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Baptist ministers and 25 religious organizations.
39  See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Cato Institute.
40  See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Bar Association.
41  See Amicus Curiae Brief of APA and APA.
42  See Amicus Curiae Brief of NOW.
43  See Amicus Curiae Brief of ACLU and ACLU of Texas.
44  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Amnesty International.
45  See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Lesbian and Gay Law Association.  
Is John Rechy, author of The Sexual Outlaw, right when he argues that promiscuous gay males are
“the shock troops of the sexual revolution,” that “the streets are the battleground,” that “the
revolution is the sexhunt,” and that “a radical statement is made each time a man has sex with
another on a street”?36  These types of questions—and the debates they engender—reflect a
proliferation of sexual projects in contemporary Western culture that fractures Justice Scalia’s simple
two-sided military conflict model, undercuts the very coherence of an expression like “homosexual
agenda” or “anti-homosexual agenda,” and complexifies the symbolic meaning of a decision like
Lawrence. 
In order to properly understand Lawrence—and other sex and cultural wars—we need a much
finer grained understanding of sexual projects and of the fragmentation of those projects.  In the
Lawrence litigation, the surprising coalitions, the telling alliances, the strange bedfellows were most
clearly visible on the libertarian side—with amicus briefs filed in support of John Lawrence by
Republican groups,37 Baptist ministers and representatives of twenty-five other religious
organizations,38 conservative think-tanks,39 the American Bar Association,40 the American
Psychiatric and Psychological Associations,41 and NOW,42 in addition to the usual suspects, the
ACLU and ACLU of Texas,43 Amnesty International,44 and gay-rights organizations.45  To be sure,
the cornucopia of  amicus briefs reflects strategy and lobbying on the part of John Lawrence’s
lawyers.  But, more important, it reflects the kind of political coalition-formation that produced the
result in Lawrence.  The same kind of fragmented politics occur on both sides of sex wars on most
issues—same-sex marriage, public sex, sado-masochism for example.  And it is what will account
for the outcomes there too.
The ruling in Lawrence simply does not lend itself to facile, dichotomous interest-group
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46  See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, ix (New
York: Routledge 1990).
political interpretation.  The result in Lawrence does not symbolize primarily an endorsement of
homosexuality or an embrace of a “homosexual agenda.”  What it reflects much more is a curious
and fascinating alliance between liberal pro-gay-rights advocates, conservative social libertarians,
Republican gay men and lesbian women, and pro-sex traditional liberal heterosexuals, among others.
The loudest message that Lawrence conveys is: “what two consenting mature adults do in their own
bedroom (as long as they are not hurting anyone) is none of the government’s business.”  The
symbolic message of Lawrence is not “We’re on board with homosexuals,” it sounds more of
“We’re against surveillance in adult bedrooms.”  
More important, the result in Lawrence is not unambiguously pro-gay. The fracturing of
sexual projects in the West also means, paradoxically, that the Lawrence decision does not so simply
or unambiguously advance the interests of all self-identified gay men, lesbian women, queers, liberal
(pro-gay) heterosexuals, or others who are gay-friendly yet reject sexual labels.  The problem is not
just the potential backlash against gay men and lesbian women that may follow the Lawrence
decision.  The rub is that the proliferation of sexual projects makes it far too simplistic today to think
about a decision such as Lawrence in dichotomous terms—as either “good” or “bad” for
“homosexuals.” Who wins and who loses depends on a much closer parsing of sexual projects.
Justice Scalia is only partly right: the decision does favor the liberal pro-gay-rights position and in
this sense is gay-friendly.  But it may, possibly, ill-serve the interests of many others who oppose the
dominance of what Judith Butler refers to as “the defining institutions of phallogocentrism and
compulsory heterosexuality.”46  There may be more to be gained from resisting a criminal stigma
where—or so long as, or on the condition that—criminal enforcement and accompanying
punishments are in fact de minimis, than there is to be lost in the normalization of conventional
deviance. 
This Foreword probes the fragmentation of sexual projects in the West and its implications
for the sex wars and the penal law.  It is intended as a guide or manual for the interpretation of the
result in Lawrence and future sex battles.  Its goal is to help make sense of the dynamic interactions
that give rise to a political resolution such as Lawrence.  In this interpretive process, Justice Scalia’s
incendiary dissent is perhaps the most helpful starting point.  Justice Scalia in Lawrence has begun
to put his finger on cultural conflict.  This Foreword builds on Scalia’s radical dissent to tap the real
pulse of the sex wars.  Part I focuses on the fracturing of sexual projects and demonstrates that it is,
today, far too simplistic—in fact profoundly counterproductive—to describe the culture wars as a
two-party conflict or to talk about a “homosexual agenda.”  In the Lawrence litigation, this point was
brought home in the surprising coalition opposing the Texas statute.  The question this raises is, what
kinds of fissures split the gay community?  What would it sound like to argue from a gay-friendly
perspective against the ruling in Lawrence?  Part II explores this question and develops through a
pastiche of radical statements a politics that embraces the marginal, even criminal desire to
transgress for the sake of transgression, that thrives on rebellion against hegemonic legal regimes.
With this in place, Part III reconstructs Scalia’s radical dissent and sharpens it to produce a keener
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47  J.I.Merritt ‘66, “Heretic in the Temple: Robby George Once Worked for George
McGovern; Now He’s the Hero of the Intellectual Right,” Princeton Alumni Weekly, October 8,
2003 (available at http://www.princeton.edu/~paw).
48  Robert P. George, The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis,
269 (Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2001).
49  George, The Clash of Orthodoxies, at 79.
interpretive framework to understand the result in Lawrence and future sex wars.  Scalia is right that
there is a culture war and that the courts are inextricably involved in those wars.  He is also right that
the court is shaped by the legal profession and that their decisions are largely shaped by the law
profession culture.  This culture—and the legal academy that reproduces it—are by and large more
tolerant of homosexuality than other sectors of society, such as listeners of talk radio or leaders of
organized religions, but also than other trade or professional networks, such as, most probably, police
or corrections officers, electricians, or perhaps corporate executives.  The decision in Lawrence is
the product of this law profession culture, and, at least on the surface, is gay-friendly—it favors the
interests of liberal pro-gay-rights advocates.  But it does not necessarily promote the interests of all
the gay-friendly.  It is here that the Foreword probes the dark side of Lawrence.    
I.
Casually inspect a contemporary high school lunch room, a college or university campus, a
youth clothing store.  Open the pages of a staid alumni magazine.  The sexual projects are, literally,
all over the map—on both sides of the traditional divides.  They are wide and varied—in fact, far
more varied than a two-party model would suggest.  This, from a cover feature on Professor Robert
George, a highly distinguished and conservative professor of politics and jurisprudence at Princeton
University, in the staid pages of the Princeton Alumni Weekly:
[According to Professor Robert George,] “Good” sex is genital sex between spouses,
while “bad” (i.e., immoral) sex is defined as sex between unmarried partners,
masturbation, or sex between spouses other than the genital-to-genital variety. He
writes in The Clash of Orthodoxies, “The plain fact is that the genitals of men and
women are reproductive organs all of the time – even during periods of sterility . . .
Insofar as the point or object of sexual intercourse is marital union, the partners
achieve the desired unity (i.e., become ‘two-in-one-flesh’) precisely insofar as they
mate . . . or, if you will, perform the type of act – the only type of act – upon which
the gift of a child may supervene.”47
George explains in greater detail in The Clash of Orthodoxies that “masturbatory and sodomitical
acts, by their nature, instrumentalize the bodies of those choosing to engage in them in a way that
cannot but damage their integrity as persons.”48  This accounts, George contends, for the “self-
alienating and dis-integrating qualities of masturbatory and sodomitical sex.”49
Contrast George—specifically on the question of homosexual sodomy—with Judge Richard
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50  Posner develops in his work, Sex and Reason, an economic theory of sexuality that, as
a descriptive matter, embraces a rational choice perspective on sexual behavior and, from a
normative perspective, adopts a libertarian position on sexual regulation—“not to be confused,”
Posner emphasizes, “with either libertine or modern liberal.” Posner, Sex and Reason, at 3.
51  Posner, Sex and Reason, at 294–295.
52  Posner, Sex and Reason, at 295–299.  In Posner’s words, “the removal of the legal
disabilities of homosexuality is unlikely to increase the amount of homosexual preference.”  Id.
at 311.
53  See generally Posner, Sex and Reason, 301–309.  Posner claims that, even without
legal disabilities, homosexuals are less happy, see id. at 303 (“It is unlikely that when every legal
disability of homosexuality has been dismantled and every heterosexual has been thoroughly
schooled in tolerance, the homosexual life-style will cease to be a distinctive and, to a significant
degree, an unhappy one”).   Childbearing and family stability are key considerations, see id. at
306, but so are others, such as artistic and therefore neurotic proclivities.  See id. at 304
(“[H]omosexuals will cluster in the artistic and decorative occupations even after tolerance for
homosexuality becomes general throughout society.  If so, we can also expect, all other
considerations to one side, the average homosexual eve in a completely tolerant society to be
somewhat more neurotic than the average person, for neurosis is the occupational hazard of
artistic people”).
54  Posner, Sex and Reason, at 308.
Posner.  Posner’s sexual project is to treat sex from a morally indifferent, purely economic
perspective.50  Posner views the homosexual life as an unhappier one than the heterosexual, and for
this reason does not wish homosexuality on anyone.  Yet he favors decriminalization.  His argument
takes three steps.  First, approximately 2.5 percent of the American population is predominantly or
exclusively homosexual and thus legal discrimination imposes a significant aggregate cost.51
Second, homosexual orientation is more innate than chosen and thus decriminalization is unlikely
to increase the number of homosexuals.52  Third, the homosexual has a less happy life than the
heterosexual—stemming primarily from the biological difficulties associated with childbearing and
the resulting disruption of family life—and there is no reason to add to their misery.53  Posner writes:
If I am correct that even in a tolerant society the male homosexual’s lot is
likely to be a less happy one on average than that of his heterosexual counterpart, still
this is no reason in itself to strew legal or other social obstacles in the path of the
homosexual.  On the contrary, in itself it is a reason to remove those obstacles in
order to alleviate gratuitous suffering.  It becomes a reason for repression only if
repression can change homosexual preference, incipient or settled, into heterosexual
preference at acceptable cost and thereby make persons who would otherwise become
or remain homosexuals happier.  There is no reason to think that repression,
psychotherapy, behavior modification, or any other technique of law or medicine can
do so in a large enough number of cases to warrant the costs, not least to the
“unconverted” homosexual, that legal and social discrimination imposes.54
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55  Posner, Sex and Reason, at 311.
56  Workshop on Law and Philosophy, September 29, 2003; regarding the lack of
enforcement, see Posner, Sex and Reason, at 309–311.
57  Communications with Richard Posner.
58  How to properly characterize the Cato Institute is itself an impossible task.  The proper
way would be “conservative but not conservative, liberal but not liberal, classical liberal,
libertarian, pro-enterprise, free market, or market liberal.”  The Cato Institute has a fascinating
discussion of its own philosophical orientation on its web site at
http://www.cato.org/about/about.html (concluding that the Institute has “a cosmopolitan,
inclusive vision for society. We reject the bashing of gays, Japan, rich people, and immigrants
that contemporary liberals and conservatives seem to think addresses society's problems. We
applaud the liberation of blacks and women from the statist restrictions that for so long kept them
out of the economic mainstream. Our greatest challenge today is to extend the promise of
political freedom and economic opportunity to those who are still denied it, in our own country
and around the world.”)
59  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet,
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1999).
60  123 S.Ct. at 2497.
61  Doug Hagin, “Supreme Court Right in Lawrence v. Texas,” July 18, 2003 (available at
http://www.intellectualconservative.com/article2476.html).  See also e.g. Brian S. Wise, “The
Supreme Court: Unlocked Doors and Whitey,” December 6, 2002 (available at
Posner concludes that “the sodomy laws ought to be repealed.”55  Though Posner agrees with
the result in Lawrence, he deplores the majority’s reasoning.  The homosexual sodomy laws are
rarely enforced and do little harm, he emphasizes.56  Although the country may not have been ready
for a pro-gay decision in 1986 at the time of Bowers v. Hardwick, Posner believes that, by 2003, 17
years later, “the climate of opinion had changed sufficiently that the court could get away with
invalidating the sodomy laws as underenforced, irrational, and a gratuitous insult to homosexuals.”57
Where does Posner, who does not wish homosexuality on anyone, yet supports the result in
Lawrence, fit in Scalia’s two-party model?  How about the Cato Institute, a conservative or classical
liberal or libertarian or market liberal think tank—notice the identity problems here too58—which
retained as counsel of record for its intervention in the Lawrence litigation William Eskridge,
professor at Yale Law School and author of one of the leading liberal pro-gay-rights texts?59  How
about the many self-identified conservatives who think homosexuality is immoral and who clearly
“do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their
home,”60 yet who support the Lawrence decision?  As one of these many self-identified conservatives
writes on www.intellecualconservative.com, “Of course most of the displeasure among
Conservatives over the Supreme Court ruling stems from our belief that Homosexuality is abnormal
and morally wrong. And yes it is wrong; it is sinful, and I strongly believe it is abnormal. Yet when
it occurs between two, or three, or more consenting adults, in the privacy of their homes it is not my
business. It is not your business. And certainly none of the government's business.”61  The fact is,
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http://www.intellectualconservative.com/article2034.html) (“To suggest the same adults who are
presumably capable of making these decisions cannot decide rationally on the matter of oral and /
or anal sex, and must therefore be overseen by law (no matter how generally unenforceable) is
ludicrous”); 
62  For general descriptions of the new term, see William Safire, “Metrosexual,” The New
York Times, Sunday December 7, 2003, Section 6, page 30, Magazine Desk; Tom McGeveran,
“Shmomo Erectus,” New York Observer, August 18, 2003, Front Page 5, pg. 1; Penelope Green,
“Books of Style: For Men From Venus,” in The New York Times, Sunday October 19, 2003,
Section 9, page 11 (reviewing Michael Flocker, The Metrosexual Guide to Style: A Handbook for
the Modern Man); Warren St. John, “Metrosexuals Come Out,” The New York Times, Sunday
June 22, 2003, Section 9, page 1; Joan Ryan, “Is New Governor a Dandy?  Schwarzenegger
Macho But Coifed,” The San Francisco Chronicle, November 18, 2003, p. A21; David Von
Drehle, “GOP Leans on CBS to Protect the Reagan Legacy,” The Washington Post, November 2,
2003, at p. A5.  The term “metrosexual” originated in 1994 initially, ironically, in an attempt to
make fun of marketers.  According to William Safire, Mark Simpson used the term first in an
article in the British paper The Independent to mock the effort by marketers and advertisers to
create a sensitive male image in order to push their products.  See, generally, Safire,
“Metrosexual,”; St. John, “Metrosexuals Come Out.” 
63  See Safire, “Metrosexual” (quoting Mark Simpson).  Under most versions, though, the
metrosexual is identified as straight and has, as his foil, the unreconstructed straight male.  He is,
in a sense, the straight male who emerges after a session with the gay guys on “Queer Eye for the
Straight Guy.”    See, generally, McGeveran, “Shmomo Erectus;” St. John, “Metrosexuals Come
Out”
64  Safire, “Metrosexual;”  St. John, “Metrosexuals Come Out.”  Here are some
definitions: “ a straight urban male with enough feminine affinities, like a knowledge of hair
products and how to use them, to make him attractive to both sexes—and to just about every
marketer on the planet,” Green, “Books of Style,” at 11; “the straight, urban man who is well-
groomed, well-dressed and perfectly at home at the cosmetics counter at Saks.  He cares deeply
there are a lot of people who do not want homosexuals around them, yet who do not support the
criminalization of homosexual sodomy.  Where do we place their sexual projects?
What about “metrosexuals,” whose sexual project is ambiguously parasitic on the
marginalization and taboo of homosexuality?  “Metrosexuals” refer somewhat imprecisely to
generally heterosexual practicing males—sometimes hyper-heterosexual—who share aesthetic
sensibilities with the more traditional stereotype of the gay male.62  This definition of metrosexual
is sketchy precisely because the thrust of the metrosexual identity—like so many others today—is
to ambiguate sexuality.  According to William Safire of the New York Times, quoting Mark Simpson
who coined the term, “He might be officially gay, straight or bisexual, but this is utterly immaterial,
because he has clearly taken himself as his own love object and pleasure as his sexual preference.”63
(The iconic figure of the metrosexual is the British soccer superstar, David Beckham who reportedly
wears nail polish, sports designer clothes, braids his hair, poses for gay magazines, and has a well-
publicized hyper-heterosexual relationship with a member of the Spice Girls).64  In seeking to
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about the width of his lapels and the crease in his slacks.  He trims his nose hair religiously,” 
Ryan, “Is New Governor a Dandy?”; “straight urban men willing, even eager, to embrace their
feminine sides,” Warren St. John, “Metrosexuals Come Out,” The New York Times, Sunday June
22, 2003, Section 9, page 1; “men who love fabric swatches and manicures even though they are
straight,” Von Drehle, “GOP Leans on CBS.”  Other somewhat synonymous terms include
“PoMosexual,” “just gay enough,” and “flaming heterosexuals.”    St. John, “Metrosexuals Come
Out.”  Note, it is also a term, according to the Washington Post, that “has gone from coinage to
eye-rolling oversue faster than nay word in the history of English”—though this may reflect,
more than anything envy of the New York Times, which in the Post’s words is the “leading
chronicle fo metrosexuality.” Von Drehle, “GOP Leans on CBS.”
65  As one self-identified metrosexual explains to the New York Times, “It doesn’t bother
me at all.  Call it homosexual, feminine, hip, not hip — I don’t care.  I like drawing from all sorts
of sources to create my own persona”  St. John, “Metrosexuals Come Out.”   According to the
Times, “Having others question their sexuality is all part of the game.”  St. John, “Metrosexuals
Come Out.”  Another critic explains: “Wanting them to wonder and having them wonder is a
wonderful thing.  It gives you an air of mystery: could he be?  It makes you stand out.”  St. John,
“Metrosexuals Come Out.” 
66  St. John, “Metrosexuals Come Out”
67  Jeffreys, The Lesbian Heresy at 99.
68  John Rechy, The Sexual Outlaw 299 (London: Futura 1979) (quoted in Jeffreys, The
Lesbian Heresy at 108).
69  http://www.gayshamesf.org/home.htm
ambiguate sexuality, the metrosexual is not only not afraid of being called or perceived as
homosexual,65 he thrives off the taboo that contributes to the mystique of being gay.  Cultural critics
have made the analogy to the way that “white suburban teenagers have long cribbed from hip-hop
culture, as a way of distinguishing themselves from the pack.”66  It is the criminalization of drugs
and guns, and the marginalization of black rap culture that makes hip hop, in part, attractive to white
suburban youths.  The metrosexual too flirts with the danger of outlaw status.  Where then do we fit
the “metrosexual” in a two-party model?
At the other end of the political spectrum, how do we categorize the radical anti-
assimilationist queer activists who embrace a marginalized status?  How about the “lesbian outlaw”
whose “status as outlaw is, for many lesbians, one important source of the satisfaction to be gained
from lesbianism”?67  What about the homosexual public-sex activist “living fully at the very edge,
triumphant over the threats, repression, persecution, prosecution, attacks, denunciations, hatred that
have tried powerfully to crush him from the beginning of ‘civilization’”?68  What about Gay Shame,
a queer activist group based in San Francisco whose web motto is “Don’t be devoured by the
consumerist monster of “Gay Pride” – Stop the monster of assimilation, before it’s too late.”69  Listen
carefully to how Gay Shame describes itself:
GAY SHAME IS THE VIRUS IN THE SYSTEM.  We are a radical alternative to
the gay mainstream and the increasingly complacent left.  We seek nothing less than
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70  http://www.gayshamesf.org/home.htm. 
71  Dennis Cooper, “Queercore,” 292, in The Material Queer: A LesBiGay Cultural
Studies Reader, ed. Donald Morton (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996).
72  Cooper at 292.
73  Quoted in Dennis Cooper, “Queercore,” at 292.
74  Bimbox statement, Toronto, Canada 1991, quoted in Cherry Smyth, Lesbians Talk
Queer Notions, 58 (London: Scarlet Press 1992) (my emphasis).
75  See generally Lauren Errea, “Queercore a musical declaration of queer pride,” Daily
Californian, February 8, 2002  (“Queer punk is about anti-assimilation.  It’s about using music as
a medium to show people a way of life they never knew about before.”); reviews of The Skin
Jobs by Ken Knox, Frontiers, Vol. 21, Issue 21, February 14, 2003 (available at
http://www.agitproprecords.com/skinjobs); reviews of the Rotten Fruits on their web site at
a new queer activism that addresses issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality to
counter the self-serving ‘values’ of the gay mainstream.  We are dedicated to fighting
the rabid assimilationist monster of corporate gay ‘culture’ with a devastating
mobilization of queer brilliance.  Gay Shame is a celebration of resistance: all are
welcome.70
Under the rubric “Queercore,” other radicals draw the line even more sharply.  Queercore
refers to “the punky, anti-assimilationist, transgressive movement on the fringe of lesbian and gay
culture.”71  It has produced a number of “zines”—e.g. “personal little xeroxed rags,” “a kind of
popular press”72—and has annual conventions that are far from conventional, even by queer terms.
This, from a 1991 editorial by Johnny Noxema and Rex Boy, the editors of the Toronto zine Bimbox:
You are entering a gay and lesbian-free zone. . .   Effective immediately, BIMBOX
is at war against lesbians and gays.  A war in which modern queer boys and queer
girls are united against the prehistoric thinking and demented self-serving politics of
the above-mentioned scum.  BIMBOX hereby renounces its past use of the term
lesbian and/or gay in a positive manner.  This is a civil war against the ultimate evil,
and consequently we must identify us and them in no uncertain terms. . .  So, dear
lesbian woman or gay man to whom perhaps BIMBOX has been inappropriately
posted . . . prepare to pay dearly for the way you and your kind have fucked things
up.73
The internal critique of gay culture is vitriolic.  It verges on the violent—at least,
verbally—as evidenced by this other pronouncement in Bimbox: “We will not tolerate any form of
lesbian and gay philosophy.  We will not tolerate their voluntary assimilation into heterosexual
culture. . .   [I]f we see lesbians and gays being assaulted on the streets, we will not intervene, we
will join in. . .   Effective immediately, [we are] at war with lesbians and gays.”74  This does sound
like a culture war, but surely it defies a two-party model.  
What about “queer punk,” a new music trend that cultivates anti-assimilation.75  These bands,
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http://www.rottenfruits.com/; 
76  Knox, Frontiers.
77  See Lyrics to “Burn Your Rainbos,” at http://www.agitproprecords.com/skinjobs/.  
78  Available at http://www.rottenfruits.com/FMedia.mp3. 
79  See Cherry Smith, “What Is This Thing Called Queer?” 279, in The Material Queer:  A
LesBiGay Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Donald Morton (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996). 
These groups engaged in extravagant actions—“a highly ironic, camp, theatrical politics of direct
action which bullied its way to the heart of the complacent media and put fun back inot a wearied
lesbian and gay movement.”  Id. at 279.
80  Bruce Bawer, “Introduction,” xiv, in Beyond Queer: Challenging Gay Left Orthodoxy,
ed. Bruce Bawer (New York: Free Press 1996).  These writers and activists have been dubbed the
“attack queers” or the “homocons” by their left opponents.  See Richard Goldstein, The Attack
Queers: Liberal Society and the Gay Right, x (London:  Verso, 2002).  However, they reject the
tag “gay conservatives.”  “Few of us would be considered conservative by anyone who
objectively examined our politics,” says Bawer.  “We variously call ourselves liberals,
moderates, libertarians, and communitarians—or we eschew such labels altogether as
increasingly irrelevant in a post-ideological era.”  Bawer, “Introduction,” at xiii.
with names like The Skin Jobs and The Rotten Fruits, are out to turn the queer left upside down.
They “tear our current notions of gay pride to shreds”76 with lyrics like: “Don’t imitate, stop trying
to fit in. If everyone looked like everyone, then tell me ‘Just who would you fuck?’  And when the
kids go ‘We’re gonna burn your rainbow and we’re having fun,’ Yeah!  We don’t need you, we don’t
care.”77  Queer punk provokes its audiences with anti-assimilationist harangues, singing the virtues
of promiscuity and rebellion.  Here are The Rotten Fruits from their song, “Fuck Media Faggots”:
“I don’t want to be ‘Queer as Folk,’  My life is no HBO joke. . .   Fuck Media Faggots, they don’t
care.  Fuck Media Faggots, they won’t dare.”78  
Where do these groups and others like them—the Whores of Babylon (Queers Fighting
Religious Intolerance), SISSY (Schools Information Services on Sexuality), or PUSSY (Perverts
Undermining State Scrutiny)79—fit in the picture? Does embracing an anti-assimilationist, radical
pro-difference, pro-marginalization position constitute part of the “so-called homosexual agenda”?
 
We live in a post-identity politics—a politics where formerly cohesive identities have
fragmented to the point that it is no longer possible to talk of a “homosexual agenda”—“so-called”
or otherwise.  The “homosexual agenda” is fractured along multiple dimensions, including,
classically, the political.  So, some self-identified gay men and lesbian women oppose the liberal pro-
gay-rights project from the right, contesting the need for broad anti-discrimination laws based on
sexual orientation.  Bruce Bawer, editor of Beyond Queer: Challenging Gay Left Orthodoxy (1996),
Andrew Sullivan and others offer what Bawer calls “a new gay paradigm:”80 the main thrust (though
it comes in different variations) is to seek an end to all public or state-sanctioned forms of
discrimination and to leave the rest alone.  “No cures or re-educations; no wrenching civil litigation;
no political imposition of tolerance;” Andrew Sullivan writes, “merely a political attempt to enshrine
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81  Andrew Sullivan, “The Politics of Homosexuality,” 80, in Beyond Queer.
82  John W. Berresford, “A Gay Right Agenda,” 108 in Beyond Queer.
83  Halley, “Sexuality Harassment” at 82.
84    Cherry Smyth, Lesbians Talk Queer Notions, 20 (London: Scarlet Press 1992)
(quoting writer and activist Simon Watney).  This perspective, in turn, has been dubbed,
ironically,  “queer”—as well as “selfish,” “immature,” and strategically foolish—from the gay
right, doubly reversing the term’s connotation:  “Queer.  Once–and still–anti-gay slur, it’s been
reclaimed by a minority of gay people as a supposedly affirmative label.”  The same-sex
marriage debates have, if anything, catalized the rifts, further splitting open the “homosexual”
faction.  As Michael Warner observes, the framing of the same-sex marriage debate “has created
a widening gap in the United States between the national lesbian and gay movement and queers.” 
Michael Warner, “Beyond Gay Marriage,” 286, in Left Legalism/Left Critique (eds. Wendy
Brown and Janet Halley) (Duke University Press 2002).  
85  Gust A. Yep, Karen E. Lovaas, and John P. Elia, “A Critical Appraisal of
Assimilationist and Radical Ideologies Underlying Same-Sex Marriage in LGBT Communities in
the United States,” Journal of Homosexuality, Vol 45(1):45–64, 50 (2003).
formal civil equality, in the hope that eventually the private sphere will reflect this public civility.”81
Within internal discussions on the right, it is acceptable to argue for social assimilation through
sexual restraint.  As John Berresford writes:
Among ourselves, we must be willing to talk about morals, to impose them on
ourselves, and to do so conspicuously.  As long as our primary image is one of
gleeful promiscuity. . . we will be ostracized.  Until we start imposing honesty,
fidelity, and emotion on our lives—in other words, until we are willing to talk about
moral standards—we will make little real progress in social acceptance.82
Other self-identified gay men, lesbian women, and queer theorists oppose the gay-rights-
project from the left, challenging the very notion of sexual identities.  Janet Halley’s critique of the
same-sex harassment protection in Oncale, discussed earlier, represents one variation.  For Halley,
the queer project “emphasizes the fictional status of sex, gender, and sexual orientation identity, and
. . . affirms rather than abhors sexuality, ‘dark side’ and all.”83  It “regards the homosexual/
heterosexual distinction with skepticism and even resentment, arguing that it is historically
contingent and is itself oppressive.”  Id. at 82.  From this perspective, it is the gay-friendly
construction of homosexuality that is problematic and reflects a deep chasm between anti-
discrimination approaches and a more radical questioning of sexuality—a conflict “not simply
between older ‘gay’ assimilationists. . . and ‘queers’ asserting their ‘queerness.’  Rather it is between
those who think of the politics of sexuality as a matter of securing minority rights and those who are
contesting the overall validity and authenticity of the epistemology of sexuality itself.”84   
In research exploring the dominant sexual ideologies in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender [“LGBT”] communities published in the Journal of Homosexuality in 2003, the authors
identify two “prominent sexual ‘ideological types’”—assimilationist and radical.85  These positions
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86  Some argue, in the same-sex marriage debates for example, that marital reform would
moderate sexual behavior among gay men and lesbian women, creating a better home
environment for children.  The idea here is that “unstructured sexual license leads to considerable
social destabilization, which among other things, is destructive to the process of raising
children.”  Yep at 51.  Gabriel Rotelo argues, for instance, that “the core institution that
encourages sexual restraint and monogamy is marriage.”  Gabriel Rotello, Sexual Ecology, 250
(New York: Dutton 1997) quoted in Yep at 51.  
87  “Marriage is the antithesis of love, and will necessarily destroy it.”  C. Saalfield,
“Lesbian marriage . . . (k)not!”, 193 in Sisters, Sexperts, queers: Beyond the Lesbian Nation, ed.
A. Stein (New York: Penguin 1993) quoted in Yep at 54.
88  Michael Warner argues that marriage defines out the zone of regulable conduct.  “As
long as people marry,” Warner writes, “the state will continue to regulate the sexual lives of
those who do not marry. . . .   In the modern era, marriage has become the central legitimating
institution by which the state regulates and permeates people’s most intimate lives; it is the zone
of privacy outside of which sex is unprotected.”  Michael Warner, “Beyond Gay Marriage,” 267,
in Left Legalism/Left Critique (eds. Wendy Brown and Janet Halley) (Duke University Press
2002).  Warner’s strategic intervention is to critique the exclusivity of marriage regardless of
whether it permits same- or only different-sex union.  His argument is that even same-sex
marriage will have a set of negative consequences on those who are not married—whether gay or
otherwise deviant or outside the norm.  What it does is “sell out less assimilationist or privileged
queers.”  Warner, “Beyond Gay Marriage,” at 275.  In this sense, “marrying consolidates and
sustains the normativity of marriage” at the expense of the non-assimilationists.  See Warner,
“Beyond Gay Marriage,” at 275.  See also Judith Levine, The Village Voice, Stop the Wedding!,
July 23-29, 2003 (“marriage—forget the ‘gay’ for a moment—is intrinsically conservative. It
does not just normalize, it requires normality as the ticket in. Assimilating another ‘virtually
normal’ constituency, namely monogamous, long-term, homosexual couples, marriage pushes
the queerer queers of all sexual persuasions—drag queens, club-crawlers, polyamorists, even
ordinary single mothers or teenage lovers—further to the margins.”)
89  Some argue, for example, that marriage will not extend social approval to gays and
lesbians.  This last idea is that marital reform “is less likely to advance queer interests than it is to
reinforce dominant social norms, defang queer movements, and increase queer invisibility.” Yep
at 54.  Though many who argue against same-sex marriage would take the position that if there is
going to be heterosexual marriage then there should be no discrimination, others argue against
same-sex marriage even if there is heterosexual marriage.  One such argument posits that being
lesbian is fundamentally different than being a heterosexual married woman, and should remain
that way.  Paula Ettelbrick writes: “As a lesbian, I am fundamentally different from non-lesbian
are familiar, especially in the context of the same-sex marriage debates.  But the truth is, each one
of these positions comes in multiple flavors.  Within the assimilationist position, there are dignity
strands, but there are also moralist strands.86  So too in the radical position, where there is a wide
range of positions.  In the gay-marriage context, for instance, there are arguments against the
institution of marriage per se,87 arguments against the resulting exclusion of marriage laws,88 as well
as more strategic arguments against marriage for gays.89  And these tensions have been present for
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women.  That’s the point.  Marriage, as it exists today, is antithetical to my liberation as a lesbian
and as a woman because it mainstreams my life and voice.  I do not want to be known as ‘Mrs.
Attached-To-Somebody-Else.’  Nor do I want to give the state the power to regulate my primary
relationship.”  Paula L. Ettelbrick, “Since When Is Marriage a Path To Liberation?” OUTLOOK:
National Lesbian & Gay Quarterly, No. 6, Fall 1989, at p. 14.  
90  In the cover article titled “Homosexual Marriage?” in the August 1953 issue of ONE,
the author “an unabashed advocate of promiscuity,” answers “no!”, warning that “acceptance of
homosexuality would necessarily lead to homosexual marriage and mandatory monogamy.”
ONE, Vol. 1, No. 8, August 1953, pp. 10–12.
91  See generally Emma Healey, Lesbian Sex Wars, 56 (London: Virago Press, 1996)
(“Butches are simply aping heterosexuality, taking the worst attributes of men…and making it all
their own. Thus, butches become an integral part of the system that oppresses women.”)
92  Jeffreys, The Lesbian Heresy: A Feminist Perspective on the Lesbian Sexual
Revolution, xi (Melbourne, Australia: Spinifex Press 1993); Cherry Smyth, Lesbians Talk Queer
Notions, 26 (London: Scarlet Press 1992).
93  Healey at 148.
94  Julia Parnaby, “Queer Straights,” 4, in All the Rage: Reasserting Radical Lesbian
Feminism, ed. Lynne Harne and Elaine Miller (New York: Teachers College Press 1996).
a long time.90  The different variations are themselves different ideologies.  The two ideal types form
a spectrum, not a dichotomous pair.  There are, in effect, moral assimilationists, incremental
assimilations, strategic assimilationists, among others, as well as radical anti-assimilationists,
libertarian radicals, separatists—a whole plethora of gay-friendly ideologies in the identified LGBT
community.  
Even within a single narrower community—the lesbian community, for example—there are
recurring,  sharp, often caustic conflicts.  In fact, from a historical perspective, what may be most
characteristic of lesbian cultural discourse and activism is its constant need to transgress—itself.
Lesbian feminists of the 1970s—Adrienne Rich, Sheila Jeffries, Mary Daly, among others—reacted
against the patriarchal elements that they perceived in lesbianism, especially the role-playing
butch/femme identities that pervaded the lesbian underworld of the 1950s and 60s, and turned toward
a more separatist approach.91   This sparked, in the 1980s, a reaction to what women saw as an “anti-
sex” attitude and a turn to S/M—to  “a new politics of outlawry, of sexual deviance.”92  As Emma
Healy tells it, the 1990s “saw a new orthodoxy that trumpeted SM sexuality while at the same time
decrying anything vanilla.”93  This new lesbian ideology was more willing to ally itself with gay men,
giving rise to queer politics.  This in turn engendered a rebirth of the lesbian feminist movement. In
essays such as Queer Straights, critics railed against the new politics of queer as a regression to
patriarchy and heterosexuality.  “[T]he ‘in your face radicalism’ which is claimed to be the most
important signifier of queer, is, in the end, hard to distinguish from plain old liberalism; queer’s
‘shocking’ tactics constitute little more than a plea to be included in straight society, rather than a
demand that we change it.”94  The bottom line is that, today, the “lesbian agenda” would be a
meaningless term: it would be necessary to distinguish between “lesbian feminists,” “lesbians who
are also feminists,” “radical lesbians” or “lesbian separatists,” “heterofeminists,” queer theory, post-
HARCOURT: OF LAWRENCE, SEX WARS, AND THE CRIM INAL LAW 19
95  Id. at xi, xii, xiii, 110, 111.
96  See Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind and Other Essays, (Boston: Beacon Press
1992).
97  Keri Sender, “Same-sex marriage: Flawed institution,” Daily Targum, May 1, 2002.
98  Because sexual projects are not coextensive with practices or with bottom line attitudes
toward identifiable practices, there is little if any empirical data on sexual projects. The best
empirical evidence on attitudes and practices simply does not address the landscape of sexual
projects.  For the best evidence on attitudes and practices, see Tom W. Smith, “American Sexual
Behavior: Trends, Socio-Demographic Differences and Risk-Behavior,” National Opinion
Research Center, December 1998 (available at http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/online/sex.pdf);see
generally, The Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender and Reproduction, Brief Summary
of U.S. Studies, Compiled 6/99 (available at www.kinsey.indiana.edu).  These studies, however,
tell us little about the fragmentation of other-regarding sexual projects.  
queer theory, “libertarian lesbians,” among others, to properly define a political intervention.95
Monique Wittig famously remarked that “Lesbians are not women.”96  By this, I take it, she meant
that the interests of lesbians do not coincide with those of lesbian feminists.  Perhaps a more accurate
statement would be, “Lesbians are not.”  
The point is that to refer to a “homosexual agenda” is as meaningless as to talk about an
“American sexual agenda,” an “American criminal law agenda,” or for that matter an anti-
“homosexual agenda.”  The internal positions vary widely.  Even the more specific concept of a
“homosexual agenda . . . directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached
to homosexual conduct” is incoherent.  This agenda ranges from homosexual public-sex
activism—from engaging in homosexual sex in public—to embracing sexual restraint and moral
puritanism.  How the myriad sexual projects compare is complex and it is what makes the sex wars
unpredictable.  It is not a war between homosexual activists (and their companions de route) against
mainstream heterosexual Americans who don’t want to be around gay and lesbians.  It is a complex,
multi-party conflict that affects conceptions of the self, relations to others, eroticism, sexual
practices, etc.  As one commentator writes in the Daily Targum, the Rutgers University paper, on
the topic of same-sex marriage: “The media has constructed a binary opposition between all Queers
along with their straight alliances, and the conservative Christian Right’s wish for the state to
prohibit the sanctioning of homosexual sins.  But, as a radical, a lesbian and a feminist, my
opposition to [normalizing homosexual relations] does not fall into these dichotomous categories.”97
 
Sexuality is so central to each individual that every person has a sexual project—by which
I mean a position on how others should act sexually, an other regarding ideology of sexual practice.
These sexual projects may or may not be related to one’s own sexual practices—some may actively
engage in one type of practice only, yet firmly believe that others should (or should be allowed) to
engage in other practices.  (Sexual projects may also include complete indifference to the practices
of others).  What is important is not the sexual practices that the individual personally engages in,
nor the bottom line dichotomous “pro” or “against” position on homosexuality or the morality of any
particular sex act.98  They may vary widely as between individuals who engage in very similar sexual
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acts—in fact, whether two persons engage in similar or different sex acts tells us very little about
how their sexual projects compare.  What matters is the ideology that surrounds other-regarding
sexual views.  Are they, for instance, based on a libertarian impulse, a libertine penchant, a pro-sex
attitude, morality, religion, or other grounds?  This matters because it will determine the future shape
of coalitions and conflict in other sex wars in the criminal law and elsewhere. 
 The proliferation and fracturing of sexual projects destabilizes simple dichotomies.  In the
more technical terms of Arrow’s Theorem, the fractiousness creates a multidimensional political
voting model that may make it difficult to predict how coalitions will form or whether they will
remain stable in future sex wars in criminal law and elsewhere.  So, for instance, the alliances that
formed in the Lawrence context become unstable in the same-sex marriage debates, where anti-
marriage libertarians and gays may ally with conservative legal moralists to overcome the pro gay-
rights and liberal coalition.  This is precisely what makes the sex wars so unpredictable, and why we
need to engage in a far more nuanced analysis of the different sexual projects to understand how they
result in coalitions, alliances, and ultimately victories or losses.  It also implies, paradoxically, that
we need to attend more carefully to fractiousness in the gay-friendly camp of the Lawrence decision.
II.
What would it sound like to ambiguate the result in Lawrence from a gay-friendly
perspective?  In her review in Artforum of the Diane Arbus exhibition “Revelations,” Judith Butler
probes the curious relationship between generations of prohibitory norms.99  Diane Arbus, in her
photographs, rebelled against the prevailing norms of bourgeois society that erased the stigmatized
body from view—the prohibitory norms that hid the physically or mentally handicapped from the
public gaze.  Arbus’ photographs are renown for their many disturbing representations of the
deviant—a veritable freak show of deformed bodies, dwarves, muscle men, the mentally ill.  Her
photographs exposed oddity, buried in everyday portraits.  The Human Pincushion, Ronald C.
Harrison, N.J. (1962) depicts the proud, perhaps defiant, bare chested, tattooed Mr. Harrison with
three-inch pins sticking through his throat, forehead, cheecks, lips, arms and chest.  The photographs
are “fascinated by human distortions, playing on spectacle, pandering to the unseemly desire to gawk
at what might seem aberrant, to peer, to invade.”100  
In their time, Arbus’ photographs challenged the prohibitory norm of surface aesthetics.
Today, however, the photographs trigger a different prohibitory norm—the norm against objectifying
the deviant, against gawking at the stigmatized body.  “We are not supposed to make into visual
spectacles human bodies that are stigmatized within public life or to treat them as objects available
for visual consumption.”101  Few are willing to pander to the desire to gawk.  Yet the more modern
prohibition against gazing at the formerly prohibited reproduces its own desire.  As Judith Butler
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explains, 
one finds oneself wanting to see what one “should not” enjoy seeing, and now partly
to test the thesis that these photos are nothing but specularization or objectification.
One does not, from a critical perspective, want to accept such a blanket judgment
without first seeing for oneself, so the desire to “see for oneself” is instigated by the
newer prohibition as well.  There is in Arbus—and in the discomfort with her
work—always that struggle: a certain solicitation to see what one should not see.102
Is it the original prohibition that accounts for our fascination today?  Are the photographs
more irresistible because of the redoubled prohibition, like some kind of return of the repressed?
Does the desire to see what we should not see make the seeing all that more intriguing?  Would there
be any fascination with seeing at all if there had not been the original prohibition?  Does our present
fascination require a former prohibition?
The notorious debates over “camp”—an older, equally ambiguated, and highly contested term
of sexual identity103—reflect much of this subtle interaction between norm and prohibition.  For
some cultural critics, camp could only exist against the norm.  In his response to Susan Sontag’s
essay, “Notes on ‘Camp,’” Andrew Britton proposed that camp could simply not exist without the
conventions of masculinity.  Although camp may define itself precisely in opposition to those
conventions of masculinity, it depends on their continuing to exist.  “The camp gay man declares,”
Britton states, “‘”Masculinity” is an oppressive convention to which I refuse to conform’; but his
non-conformity depends at every point on the preservation of the convention he ostensibly rejects
– in this case, a general acceptance of what constitutes ‘a man.’”104  The rejection of the norm,
Britton suggests, requires the norm.  Role-playing demands the foil.  “Camp behavior is only
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recognisable as a deviation from an implied norm, and without that norm it would cease to exist, it
would lack definition.  It does not, and cannot, propose for a moment a radical critique of the norm
itself.”105  This is so because the camp identity, according to Britton, plays off the convention.106
Part of the vitality of camp, then, is the transgression.  “Camp requires the frisson of
transgression, the sense of perversity in relation to bourgeois norms which characterises the
degeneration of the Romantic impulse in the second half of the nineteenth century, and which
culminates in England with Aestheticism and in France with the décadence,” Britton writes.  “Camp
is a house-trained version of the aristocratic, anarchistic ethic of transgression, a breach of decorum
which no longer even shocks, and which has gone to confirm the existence of a special category of
person – the male homosexual.”107  This idea of frisson harks back to Jean Genet—and, before him,
to the Surrealist, André Breton.  Genet’s romanticization of the delinquency of homosexuality—of
homosexual rape in Querelle—did not aspire to decriminalization.  As Jean-Paul Sartre writes in his
study of Genet, Saint Genet, “Genet does not want to change anything at all.  Do not count on him
to criticize institutions.  He needs them, as Prometheus needs his vulture.”108  
Part of what may be going on is the erotic attraction to the utterly deviant—but only part.
There is far more to desire than the erotic, and the biological dimensions of homosexuality
undermine any simple association between sexual orientation and the appeal of deviance.  Yet there
may well be an erotic dimension to the prohibited.  Sheila Jeffreys quotes a delicious passage from
Sarah Schulman’s novel, After Dolores, where a character says:
It’s too easy to be gay today in New York City.  I come from those times when sexual
excitement could only be in hidden places.  Sweet women had to put themselves in
constant danger to make love to me.  All my erotic life is concerned with intrigue and
secrets.  You can’t understand that these days, not at all.  Lesbians will never be that
sexy again.109
Lesbians will never be that sexy again. To what extent does the erotic derive from the
forbidden?  Glamour magazine reports having conducted, in partnership with MensHealth.com, a
survey of 2,793 men to explore issues of sexual practices.  One question they asked was “Why are
men so fixated on having anal sex?”  (Who knew?)  Forty-seven percent of the respondents answered
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“because it’s taboo.”  (Twenty-two percent chose “because it feels great,” and thirty-one percent
“because it’s an accomplishment just talking her into it.”)110  Does the taboo really account for the
erotic practice?  And is the practice really erotic if it is brought on by taboo, or is it some other kind
of desire?  Chicago public radio reports an increase in HIV infection in inner-city high schools in
Chicago.  One explanation is a  lot more experimenting with bisexual relations among inner-city
male teenagers in part because of the stigma of same-sex intercourse.111  Survey data from the period
1988-1998 suggests an increase in the percentage of people with same-sex partners, despite constant
levels of “exclusively” homosexual men and women.  The survey data—from the General Social
Surveys conducted by NORC at the University of Chicago over the period 1988 to 1998—revealed
between a doubling and tripling of the likelihood of having a same-gender sex partner over the
period (though the number remained low in 1998, 4.1 percent for men and 2.8 percent for women).112
The increase could not be attributed to changing demographics, increased urbanization or
educational attainment, or racial or ethnic shifts in the population.  Is the increase due to greater
social acceptance of homosexual relations or to the taboo associated with same-sex relations?
Think of unsafe sex among gay men in urban areas—what is known as “barebacking,” a term
used to describe unprotected anal sex.113  Or even more troubling, “bug chasing,” the practice of
some gay men of actively trying to acquire HIV through unprotected same-gender sex.  A recent
documentary by filmmaker Louise Hogarth, “The Gift,” documents the new development.  The title
derives “from the term ‘gift givers,’ or HIV-positive men who give ‘the gift’ of HIV infection.”114
In the documentary, “a soft-spoken, Midwestern college youth named Doug Hitzel tearfully recalls
what drove him to become a ‘bug chaser’—an HIV-negative man who seeks to be infected with the
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virus that causes AIDS.”115  The attraction to danger and to deviance must play a role in these
practices.  
Criminality, prohibition, danger—seduction.  As Jack Katz powerfully demonstrates in
Seductions of Crime, the thrill of breaking the law can produce an emotional high.  Katz describes
in compelling detail the thrill-seeking of some of his students who shoplift.  He shows, through their
own words, how merchandise in stores become so much more irresistible because they are forbidden.
“There we were, in the most lucrative department Mervyn’s had to offer. . . .   Once my eyes caught
sight of the beautiful white and blue necklaces alongside the counter, a spark inside me was once
again ignited. . . .   Those exquisite puka necklaces were calling out to me, ‘Take me!  Wear me!
I can be yours!’”116  It is the criminality of shop lifting that makes the jewelry so attractive, the theft
so thrilling, and the object so compelling.  One student explains:  “Every time I would drop
something into my bag, my heart would be pounding and I could feel this tremendous excitement,
a sort of ‘rush’ go through me.”117  Another student reports, “The experience was almost orgasmic
for me.  There was a build-up of tension as I contemplated the danger of the forbidden act, then a
rush of excitement at the moment of committing the crime, and finally a delicious sense of
release.”118  Yet another recalls: “It’s really funny being 23 years old now and in writing this, I can’t
stop feeling how thrilling it was, certainly a feeling much like the anticipation of sex.”119
The same prohibition helps make guns so seductive to detained youths,120 Gangsta-rap so
exciting for suburban youths,121 and pink underwear so attractive to adults.  Pink underwear?  Sheriff
Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona, started issuing pink boxers to his jail inmates in order to stem
vandalism of underwear stock—Arpaio reported losing more than $40,000 worth of purloined
underwear in a nine-month period in 1995.  The pink boxers became such a phenomenon, that
Arpaio started selling the pink boxers on the free market for $10 per boxers.122  According to the
Phoenix New Times writing in 1995, “Souvenir versions of the boxer shorts have become all the
rage. Volunteers in the 2,500-member Sheriff's Posse have sold 3,000 pairs of pink skivvies,
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As long as she lives Stephen never forgot her first impressions of the bar known
as Alec’s—that miserable meeting-place of the most miserable of all those who
comprised the miserable army.  That merciless, drug-dealing, death-dealing haunt
to which flocked the battered remnants of men whom their fellow-men had at last
stamped under; who, despised of the world, must despise themselves beyond all
grossing $30,000" in 1995 alone.123
But there is more to homosexual erotic attraction than the forbidden, and there must also be
more to the forbidden than erotic attraction.  There is something else, something deeper about the
attraction of deviance, about the urge to resist hegemonic power, about the felt need to ‘question
authority,’ about the desire to ‘subvert the dominant paradigm.’  How do these emotions, desires,
urges, personalities depend on, relate to, derive from prohibitory norms?  Sheila Jeffreys writes about
“the lesbian romance with outlaw status.”  She suggests that “The lesbian’s status as outlaw is, for
many lesbians, one important source of the satisfaction to be gained from lesbianism. . . . 
[L]esbianism offers the glamour and excitement of outlawry.”124  As Ruby Rich explains, “For many
women, the drive toward lesbianism was not only sexual but also a will to be the outlaw, the same
drive that moved other subcultures, like the Beats, to cross to the ‘wrong’ side of the tracks, if only
metaphorically.  Thus, there was a very real sense of loss associated with the hard-won respectability:
a loss of taboo and with it eroticism.”125
In fact, some of these critics argue that, as lesbianism became more acceptable, the appeal
of the outlaw led to “outlaw sexuality”—sadomasochism.  “Where once outlawry could be assured
simply by adoption of lesbian sexuality and lifestyle it seems that the apparently greater social
possibilities gained for lesbians by lesbian liberation have made things too easy,” thus leading to the
new “sexual outlaw” lesbians engaging in S/M.126  “A political movement of sexual outlawry has
developed in the eighties amongst lesbians of which the glamourising of prostitution is but one part.
The new lesbian politics of transgression is an offshoot of an older tradition in gay male culture and
politics.”127  
The outlaw impulse, Jeffreys suggests, is tied closely to the attraction to the lesbian bar and
bar culture—places that are often described as “dingy” or “decadent.”   “Lesbian bars,” at least in
London, “have traditionally been sited in cellars or basements with backed up toilets, crush, smoke,
and terrible food,”128 likely in order to escape the attention of homophobes.129 In part, what may
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creatures shabby yet tawdry, timid yet defiant—and their eyes, Stephen never
forgot their eyes, those haunted, tormented eyes of the invert.
 Jeffreys, The Lesbian Heresy at 102 (quoting Radclyffe Hall, The Well of Loneliness, 393
(London: Virago 1982).  
130  Jeffreys, The Lesbian Heresy at 103.  Sheila Jeffreys is deeply critical of these outlaw
instincts, especially as they relate to heterosexual desire.  To her, the heterosexual can use the
outlaw fantasy as a way to reify his desire for normality.  For the lesbian, though, there is no out. 
“The rebelliousness that upper class white men have engaged in historically nas not hurt them.  It
has been a rite of passage.  They journey to the underworld composed of women and boys in
prostitution, dabble in drugs and exploitative and abusive sex, then succeed to the family
business or Harley Street.  This form of rebellion is specifically masculine and has generally been
carried out at the expense of women.  The underworld is a necessary flipside which provides
light relief as well as a reminder of the reasons to pursue respectable marriage.”  Jeffreys, The
Lesbian Heresy at 112.  As she writes elsewhere:  “Th[e] romance with decadence and outlawry
exists in heterosexual culture too and particularly in gay male culture.  Rebellious counter-
cultural heterosexuals who gain satisfaction from living in opposition to suburban values can get
decadent kicks from a sleazy jazz nightclub.  For heterosexuals decadence is a chosen path which
can be swapped at any moment for a regular Neighborhours type lifestyle.  For lesbians and gay
men the sordid nature of our social venues is the result of our oppression.”   Jeffreys, The
Lesbian Heresy at 102.  
131  As Smyth explains, “Several US cities have recently [1992] seen the birth of groups of
‘New Radicals’—young queers who are too queer for Queer Nation and have begun to pit
themselves in opposition, not to heterosexuals, but to the ‘assimilationist’, sell-out lesbian and
account for this attraction is, Jeffreys suggests, “nostalgie de la boue, an expression coined in the end
of century decadence of the 1890s to denote a fascination with ‘low-life’ amongst the bourgeoisie.
This fascination was acted out by middle-class straight men mainly through consorting with
prostitutes in London bars. . . .   Oscar Wilde was fascinated with his favourite version of boue i.e.
use of young working class male prostitutes and drugs and not just in practice but in art.  In The
Picture of Dorian Gray Wilde painted a romantically decadent picture of the opium den.”130
The opium den of the late nineteenth century plays an equally mystical role in the work of
Charles Baudelaire.  The forbidden, the haunting pleasures of escape, the fascination with spleen,
run through Les Fleurs du Mal.  The romanticized Bohemian life of the late nineteenth century
cohabited parasitically alongside, within, and against the dominant bourgeois society.  It fed off the
moral and legal opprobrium of the bourgeoisie.  It needed bourgeois society in the same way that
camp needs masculinity.  
Perhaps the best way to understand the constitutive dimensions of deviance is to listen
carefully to the more radical activists today—the second wave of more militant, radical, younger
queer activists, sometimes called “post-queer,”131 Queercore, or pomo-queer.  What do they seek
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from deviance?  In the introduction to their edited volume, PomoSexuals, Carol Queen and Lawrence
Schimel write:
Pomosexuality lives in the space in which all other non-binary forms of
sexual and gender identity reside—a boundary-free zone in which fences are crossed
for the fun of it, or simply because some of us can’t be fenced in.  It challenges
either/or categorizations in favor of largely unmapped possibility and the intense
charge that comes with transgression.  It acknowledges the pleasure of that
transgression, as well as the need to transgress limits that do not make room for all
of us.132
Writing about Queercore, Dennis Cooper suggests:
Based on everything I’ve read, heard, interpreted, and felt, they are disappointed that
so many lesbians and gays have accepted the heterosexual model of normalcy,
reiterating all of society’s mistakes in Disneyesque ghettos like West Hollywood, the
Castro, the Village.  The new queers accept that assimilation [is] irreversible for
much of lesbian/gay culture at this point.  So they’re trying to construct an alternate
culture in and around it.  They don’t pretend for a moment that they can alter the
dominant culture—gay or straight.  They don’t want to.  All they really want is to be
taken seriously.  And left alone.133
Left alone.  Could that possibly mean, left alone while leaving in place the legal prohibition against
homosexual relations? 
 In the U.K., there developed a group called “Homocult-perverters of culture” based in
Manchester in the early 1990s that positioned itself in opposition to the queer activist group OutRage
as “too queer to be OutRaged.”134  In their poster, they declare that the terms “lesbian and gay”
describe:
Persils fucked up by privilege who wish to blend with sick society rather than change
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it. . .   OutRage is a cosy sham.  You can only be outraged by what surprises you.  It’s
no surprise to common queers that there is no justice for us.  We are not outraged.
WE ARE DEFIANT.135
This defiance is a form of radical critique that goes beyond mere reform.  It aims instead at
“radical social change: change which strikes at the ‘root,’ at the ‘source,’ at the ‘structural
foundations’ of the social ‘system,’ pushing change forward towards transformation of the social
totality rather than mere reformation of even conservation of this existing system.”136  There are more
theorized statements of this position—or perhaps less radical positions that nevertheless seek more
than reform.  Cathy Cohen expresses this position in her article “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare
Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?”137, where she too laments the failed potential of
queer politics.  She argues that “a truly radical or transformative politics has not resulted from queer
activism,” in large part because “instead of destabilizing the assumed categories and binaries of
sexual identity, queer politics has served to reinforce simple dichotomies between heterosexual and
everything ‘queer.’”138 What has been left unchallenged is “an understanding of the ways in which
power informs and constitutes privileged and marginalized subjects on both sides of this
dichotomy.”139  Cohen argues for a “new politics”:
I envision a politics where one’s relation to power, and not some homogenized
identity, is privileged in determining one’s political comrades.  I’m talking about a
politics where the nonnormative and marginal position of punks, bulldaggers, and
welfare queens, for example, is the basis for progressive transformative coalition
work.  Thus, if there is any truly radical potential to be found in the idea of queerness
and the practice of queer politics, it would seem to be located in its ability to create
a space in opposition to dominant norms, a space where transformational political
work can begin.140
The thrust of this “new politics” is opposition to dominant norms by all those “who stand on
the outside of the dominant constructed norm of state-sanctioned white middle- and upper-class
heterosexuality.”141  It focuses on a close analysis of “the intersection of systems of oppression.”142
It proposes a more expansive understanding of political coalitions that embraces other marginalized
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143  Cohen at 442 (quoting Urvashi Vaid, Virtual Equality).
144  Cohen at 443 (quoting Vaid).
145  Carol Queen and Lawrence Schimel, “Introduction,” 21, in PomoSexuals:
Challenging Assumptions about Gender and Sexuality, eds. Carol Queen and Lawrence Schimel
(San Francisco, CA: Cleis Press 1997).  
146  Dennis Cooper, “Queercore,” 296, in The Material Queer: A LesBiGay Cultural
Studies Reader, ed. Donald Morton (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996)
147  Carol Queen and Lawrence Schimel, “Introduction,” 21, in PomoSexuals.
148  The incrementalist argument is captured well in this letter to the editor by a self-
identified gay man to the L.A. Weekly: “I don’t know what is more pathetic, the retrograde
hatefulness of the current “gay backlash” or the screechy, pushy tactics from left-wing gays that
caused it . . . .  How often do people really get convicted under arcane sodomy laws? Haven’t
most major employers adopted “domestic partnership” policies to extend the same insurance and
other benefits to its gay employees that everyone else enjoys? Instead of building methodically on
those gains while maintaining a positive public image, GLAAD and other gay political
identities based on race, class, etc.   It is a politics different from liberal or civil rights—frameworks
that are ineffective at confronting homophobia, Cohen argues.  Civil rights, Cohen asserts, “do not
change the social order in dramatic ways; they change only the privileges of the group asserting those
rights.”143  The reason is that civil rights movements seek only access to the dominant framework,
they do not challenge the framework of rights.  But it is that framework of rights—not the lack of
civil rights—that produces the systematic homophobia.  It is “the nature and construction of the
political, legal, economic, sexual, racial and family systems within which we live.”144  
The problem, of course, is that Cohen simply substitutes “white middle- and upper-class
heterosexual” for “heterosexual,” without in any way problematizing the category, the idea of class,
or the concept of heterosexuality itself.  It seems that the more theorized the expression of the radical
position, the less well it captures the positive and dark side of deviance.  There has to be something
more than simple class or identity warfare.  There must exist a space for a genuine non-
assimilationist, non-reformist, nihilist, hedonistic appreciation of marginalization.  
Perhaps the best or only way to express this politics, then, is through a pastiche of post-queer
venom.  It has something to do with ‘the intense charge that comes with transgression and the
pleasure of that transgression.’145  It involves ‘an alternate culture in and around it, to be taken
seriously, and left alone.’146  It is a ‘boundary-free zone in which fences are crossed for the fun of
it, or simply because some of us can’t be fenced in.  It challenges either/or categorizations in favor
of largely unmapped possibility.’147  It is nostalgic, transgressive, full of hope and hopeless at the
same time.  It is a politics of spleen—an expression that refers back and captures the uncomfortable
co-dependence of nineteenth-century Bohemia on bourgeois law and society.
I have endeavored here to explore the constitutive, dark side of the penal sanction.  There are,
of course, other friendly but skeptical accounts of Lawrence—but they only scratch the surface.
There is the backlash argument—the incrementalist argument against Lawrence-type litigation.148
HARCOURT: OF LAWRENCE, SEX WARS, AND THE CRIM INAL LAW 30
organizations have been waging war on any public or private group that espouses religious
convictions that do not accept homosexuality (and that’s most of them). They have defended
explicit sexual messages in advertising and promoted homosexual education to schoolchildren.
Quiet assimilation has long been discarded as a goal by gay leadership in favor of in-your-face
queer activism.”  Tony Blass, Letters to the Editor: Gay Rights Overkill, L.A. Weekly Aug. 19 –
Sept. 4, 2003.
149  For an illustration of pro-gay fear, see Tom McGeveran, “Shmomo Erectus,” New
York Observer, August 18, 2003 (“So recently, it seemed, it had been time to break out the Skyy
Vodka and cranberry juice to cheer the Supreme Court's June 26 ruling in Lawrence v. Texas ,
which struck down the 17-year-old ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick , which upheld states' rights to
outlaw sodomy. Fearmongers on the right, and their perennially hopeful counterparts on the left,
were already talking about the inevitability of gay-marriage rights as a result of the majority's
decision, which went beyond simply striking down the Texas law to offer gays a measure of the
same "privacy" afforded women under Roe v. Wade. . . . But before long, a Gallup poll found an
unexpected reversal in the country's feelings about gay marriage: In the space of less than two
months, popular support for extending legal rights to gay unions had dropped eight percentage
points, from 57 percent to 49 percent. Buzz-kill!”).
150  Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, Eleventh
Circuit, No. 01–16723, January 28, 2004.  The statute in question states that “No person eligible
to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual,” and has been interpreted by
Florida courts to apply only to persons who are known to engage in current voluntary
homosexual acts.  The court there found a rational basis for the discrimination in the state’s
interest in assuring an optimal home environment for children; relying on the best-interest-of-the-
child analysis, the court declared that “because of the primacy of the welfare of the child, the
state can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be constitutionally suspect in
many other arenas.”
151  The Supreme Court had remanded the case to the Kansas state court for
reconsideration in light of Lawrence.  The state court held that the sentencing disparities were
justified by “traditional sexual mores” as well as the interest in preventing sexually transmitted
diseases.
Some pro-gay activists warn that the Lawrence decision may scare many away from the prospect of
gay-marriage or create a more hostile environment for gay men and lesbian women.149  And of
course, there have been a number of judicial decisions rendered since Lawrence, as well as polling
data, that flame these debates.  With each new ruling, with each new poll, there are loud waves of
“I told you so” rolling through the legal academy—on both sides of the debate.  The Eleventh Circuit
upheld Florida’s adoption laws which preclude adoption by any person who engages in homosexual
activity.150  A Kansas court of appeals upheld a disparate sentencing scheme that punishes far more
severely an older teenager when he engages in sex with a same-sex younger teenager as opposed to
a different-sex younger teenager.151  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in two separate
decisions, has required same-sex marriage, not just civil union.  And the polling data reflect a
backlash in public opinion regarding both whether homosexual relations should be legal—the
Lawrence issue—and whether the state should allow same-sex marriage—at least in the short
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152  See http//www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2003-07-28-poll-gays-issues.htm. 
According to historical polling data from USAToday/Gallup polls, public opinion became
consistently and increasingly more favorable toward the legalization of homosexual relations
between consenting adults during the period from July 1988 to May 2003—just before the
Lawrence decision was released.  Whereas only 35 percent of the population favored the
legalization of homosexual relations in July 1988, that number steadily increased during the
1990s, reaching 50 percent in February 1999 and going as high as 60 percent in May 2003. 
However, one month after the Lawrence decision, that number had shot down to between 50 and
48 percent.  In a similar vein, those how believed homosexual relations should not be legal
decreased from 57 percent in July 1988 to about 35 to 37 percent in May 2003.  Yet one month
after the Lawrence decision, the number was back up to between 46 and 44 percent.  A New
York Times/CNN poll reveals a similar trend: whereas in July 2003, their polling data revealed
that 54 percent of respondents supported the legality of homosexual relations, in December 2003
that number had decreased to 41 percent.  New York Times, December 21, 2003.  (It is possible,
of course, that people understand the word “legality” differently now, associating it with gay-
marriage rather than sodomy laws).  The same trends in public opinion on the question of gay-
marriage have also been identified, though the time frame is more narrow.  Again according to
the USAToday/Gallup polls, over the period May 2001 to May 2003, public opinion increasingly
favored allowing homosexual couples to enter civil unions, up from 44 percent to 49 percent
respectively.  However, one month after Lawrence, the number had fallen to 40 percent, lower
than any previously recorded poll during the period.  See
http//www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2003-07-28-poll-gays-issues.htm. 
153    Some argue, for instance, that the “political bargains” that gay-rights advocates make
“circumvent rather than embrace the challenge to heteronormativity, thus leaving dominant
norms intact.”  Mary Bernstein, “Gender, Queer Family Policies, and the Limits of Law,” 420, in
Queer Families, Queer Politics: Challenging Culture and the State, ed. Mary Bernstein and
Renate Reimann (New York: Columbia University Press 2001).  The reason is, Bernstein argues,
advocates have to frame the issues in the least offensive or threatening way in order to achieve
any victories.  To succeed, they have to be framed in more innocuous right-to-privacy terms. So,
Bernstein writes:
Changes in laws regarding sexual orientation are dependent on the ability
to frame the challenge in a way that leaves heteronormativity untroubled.  Sodomy
has been decriminalized in more than half the American states, because it was
framed as an issue of privacy or as a victimless crime.  Such a framing has helped
in gaining a narrow legal victory but has neither challenged the underlying
term.152 
But the backlash critique—whether right or wrong—still aspires to the elimination of
criminal sodomy laws.  It is a strategic argument, not an outlaw argument.  The same is true of the
other friendly but skeptical critique, the accommodation argument—namely the idea that civil rights
litigation never really challenges the anti-gay norms.153  These arguments all aspire to a liberation
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opprobrium associated with homosexuality nor helped in the quest for acceptance. 
Even the symbolic victory of decriminalization is mooted by the insistence on
privacy.
Bernstein at 439.
154  This is true, as well, of the early queer activism, which, though radical and civil
disobedient, sought liberation.  Perhaps through radical means—by fighting back—but liberation
none the less.  The early queer movements of the 1990s in the U.S. and U.K. were liberationist. 
Queer Nation, which was born in 1990 in New York City, organized under the slogan “Queers
Bash Back,” developed a confrontational style but based it on liberation movements.  The same
is true for OutRage, organized in London a few weeks later.  OutRage defined itself as “a broad
based group of lesbians and gay men committed to radical non-violent direct action and civil
disobedience to . . . affirm the rights of lesbians and gay men to sexual freedom, choice and self-
determination.”  Cherry Smyth, Lesbians Talk Queer Notions, 17 (London: Scarlet Press 1992). 
Though certainly anti-assimilationist, these movements were liberatory and not radically
separatist.
155  The court ruled in favor of the magazine ONE, reversing the Ninth Circuit in a per
curiam single-sentence opinion relying on Roth v. United States, which effectively applied the
same standard of obscenity to homosexual as heterosexual material.  See [cite]; see generally
Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 27–50.
ideal that does not necessarily embrace deviance.154  I have sought instead to explore the positive side
of the deviant impulse. 
III.
With all this in place, it may be possible to reconstruct Justice Scalia’s incendiary dissent,
to tweak it so that it reflects more accurately the nuances and subtleties of our contemporary sex
wars.  To begin, Justice Scalia is certainly right that there is a culture war in this country that
encompasses, among other things, the trilogy of sexuality, family, and morality/religion—what I
would call a war of sexual projects.  Justice Scalia is also right that the Supreme Court partakes in
the culture wars in Lawrence.  The court’s engagement, however, is by no means new or a departure
from some neutral role as arbiter of the democratic rules of engagement.  The Supreme Court has
been a central player in these culture wars since at least the mid-twentieth century. There is a rich
tradition of gay-rights cases going back to the 1950s.  Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price chronicle the
history of Supreme Court cases affecting the rights of gay men and lesbian women in their excellent
book, Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court.  They trace the start of the
gay-rights lineage of cases back to ONE v. Olesen, a 1955 Supreme Court ruling on the censorship,
on obscenity grounds, of the nation’s first homosexual publication, ONE—where the court ruled in
favor of the gay publication and imposed the same standard of obscenity on homosexual as
heterosexual material.155  Murdoch and Prince chronicle over 18 cases decided on the merits—and
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156  As Murdoch and Price correctly emphasize, relying on the work of H. W. Perry,
Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court, the denial of cert is not
a neutral act.  “[J]ustices use the cert process strategically to further their legal goals.  In his
study of the 1976–80 court terms, Perry found insiders saying without prompting that
homosexuality was the one topic the court consistently ducked.”  Murdoch and Price, Courting
Justice at 16–17 (citing Perry at 257–258).
157  See Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice, Appendix, 531–535.
158  See e.g. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, [cite] (1963); Boutilier v. INS, [cite] (1967); 
159  See e.g., Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission (1977); Webster v. Doe
[cite] (1988). 
160  See e.g., Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force, [cite]
(1985), 
161  See San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, [cite] (1987)
(ruling against the use of the term by gay olympic organizers).
162  See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, [cite]
(1995).
163  See Romer v. Evans, [cite] (1996).
164  See Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council v. James Dale, [cite] (2000).
165 [cite] (vacating circuit court decision finding anti-sodomy law in Texas too broad).
166 [cite] (reversing lower court decision finding “crime against nature” law in Florida too
vague)
167 [cite] (upholding anti-sodomy law in Virginia)
168 [cite].  Uplinger involved a New York statute criminalizing importuning (non-
commercial solicitation) of homosexual sodomy.  He court ultimately dismissed the case as
improvidently granted but only after taking cert, briefing, and oral argument.  
169 [cite].  
170  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 378.
list in an appendix over 80 cases including important certiorari denials156—that dealt with
homosexuality.157  These included cases addressing the deportation of immigrants for
homosexuality,158 employment discrimination against homosexuals,159 the right of teachers to
advocate gay rights issues,160 and the use of the term “Olympics” for the Gay Olympic Games,161 as
well as the more well-known recent cases involving the exclusion of a gay group from Boston’s St.
Patrick’s Day Parade,162 Colorado’s anti-gay Amendment 2,163 and the Boy Scouts of America’s
exclusion of gays.164  Moreover, the court has addressed the issue of homosexual sodomy on several
previous occasions, including Wade v. Buchanan in 1971,165 Wainright v. Stone in 1973,166 Doe v.
City of Richmond in 1976,167 New York v. Uplinger in 1984,168 and, of course, Bowers v. Hardwick
in 1986.169  Several of the justices had dealt with homosexuality cases as well before acceding to the
Supreme Court.  Justice Kennedy, for instance, while serving on the Ninth Circuit, had ruled in five
cases involving homosexual issues and had written the decision in a case upholding Navy regulations
that banned homosexuals.170
Moreover, the justices themselves actively partake in the culture wars, not only through their
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171  Justice O’Connor noted in a speech to the Minnesota Women Lawyers group that “If
statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be
executed . . . .  Perhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death
cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.”  Noting that
Minnesota does not have the death penalty, O'Connor said, "You must breathe a big sigh of relief
every day." See Fox News, O'Connor, in Speech, Blasts Death Penalty, Lawyer Fees and Zero
Tolerance.  July 3, 2001 (available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,28675,00.html). 
Justice Ginsburg reportedly said in a speech that “I have yet to see a death case among the dozens
coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was
well represented at trial . . . .  People who are well represented at trial do not get the death
penalty.”  See CBSNews, Justice Back Death Penalty Freeze, April 10, 2001.
172  Justice Kennedy, for instance, stated that “Our resources are misspent, our
punishments too severe, our sentences too long . . . .  I can accept neither the necessity nor the
wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences.  In all too many cases, mandatory minimum
sentences are unjust." See Fox News, Justice Kennedy Mandatory Minimums Often Unjust,
August 11, 2003.  Justice Breyer, also commenting on mandatory minimum sentences, said that
“There has to be oil in the gears.  There has to be room for the unusual or the exceptional case. 
[In many statutes] there is no room for flexibility on the downside.  That is not a helpful thing to
do.  It's not going to advance the cause of law enforcement in my opinion and it's going to set
back the cause of fairness in sentencing.”  See Fox News, Supreme Court Justice Blasts
Mandatory Minimums.  Sept. 22, 2003.  
173  123 S.Ct. at 2497.
written opinions, but also and importantly through their speeches.  Justice Scalia is notorious for
making provocative statements in speeches.  As noted earlier, he has taken the fight over homosexual
sodomy beyond the courthouse.  He has also made comments about other cultural conflicts,
including the controversy over the pledge of allegiance which has caused him to recuse himself from
hearing that case.  Justice Scalia is very much of a cultural warrior, and he is, of course, not alone.
Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg have made politically-engaged comments about the death
penalty,171 and  Justices Kennedy and Breyer about mandatory minimum sentencing.172  
To be sure, in his dissenting opinion Justice Scalia maintains that the court does not
participate in the culture wars when it does not “depart[] from its role of assuring, as neutral
observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.”173  Scalia contends, in the sodomy
context, that finding a federal constitutional right is partaking in the culture war, but leaving it to the
democratic process is not.  It is not entirely clear whether Scalia is being completely sincere in this
respect, given that much of his dissenting opinion is turned over to arguing that Roe v. Wade should
be overruled—in other words, given that he too, like the majority which he criticizes, is playing fast
and loose with the standard of stare decisis.  But if sincere, then Scalia’s argument definitely needs
to be tweaked because it fundamentally misunderstands the concept of “war”and fails to appreciate
that any decision about the rule of decision to apply in the sodomy context—whether to accept legal
moralism or impose a harm principle—represents a judicial choice.  In this respect, Toni Massaro
is right:  “The Court in Lawrence did step into a cultural fray, to be sure.  But no matter how the
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174  Toni Massaro, “Some Lessons of the Supreme Court Term Just Past,” draft
manuscript at 49.  
175  Scalia writes:  “I noted in an earlier opinion the fact that the American Association of
Law Schools (to which any reputable law school must seek to belong) excludes from membership
any school that refuses to ban from its job-interview facilities a law firm (no matter how small)
that does not wish to hire as a prospective partner a person who openly engages in homosexual
conduct.” Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2496.
Court resolved Lawrence, it would have been engaged in that fray. . .”174  
The decision about which decision rule to follow is itself a choice and is never neutral.
Justice Scalia misses a basic existentialist insight.  Bowers itself was not a neutral decision: the
decision to let morality simpliciter satisfy rational basis review—without a showing of harm—is
itself a loaded choice.  It requires continuing to buy into legal moralism.  It is not dictated.  Instead
it reaffirms.  The same is true of adopting or reaffirming a harm principle.  Requiring a showing of
harm in order to satisfy rational basis review is not a neutral act.  It may well be the case that, for
many years, majoritarian morality was a valid basis for penal prohibition.  But each time the court
decided to keep it that way, the court had the option of changing the decisional rule, of inching
toward a harm principle.  Every time it chose not to, it chose not to.   To suggest that the court would
not engage in the culture war by leaving the democratic process to its own devices is blinking reality.
Moreover, in this culture war, the very rules of war are at stake.  The court is not an outside
observer overseeing the sex  wars.  The court is not a referee, because it is precisely the rules of the
game that are being fought over.  The rule whether there is foul play—whether a party, like the state,
has overreached or gone off-sides—are up for grabs.  Scalia is, in effect, mixing metaphors and, in
the process, forgetting that this is a war, not a refereed game.  The way to think about this conflict
is not in terms of a formal game with established rules where the court is there to make sure that the
game is being played properly.  The way to think about this is in war terms: there are no rules, there
is no arbiter, there is no referee.  And when a case is filed in federal court, the federal courts
inextricably takes sides.  They have no option not to participate.  Dismissing the claim under Rule
12(b)(6) is no more neutral than ruling on the merits of the constitutional argument.  Granting
certiorari, denying certiorari—these are not neutral acts.  
Next, Justice Scalia is undoubtedly right that the majority’s decision in Lawrence is indeed
shaped by the legal-professional complex within which the Supreme Court exists and operates.  In
claiming that the decision “is the product of a law-profession culture,” Scalia is making an accurate
statement.  In identifying the legal academy as an important institution in shaping the legal-
professional complex, Scalia is also right.175  And in claiming that the law-profession culture “has
largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda,” Scalia is, to be sure, painting with a broad
brush, perhaps too broad a brush, but there is nevertheless a grain of truth in what he says.  The legal-
professional structure that most closely touches the Supreme Court—namely, the elite legal academy
that produces not only most of the justices, but also most of their law clerks, most of the
constitutional commentators, and many of the regular oral advocates—tends to be liberal, equal-
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176  Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer attended Harvard Law School,
and Ginsburg received her law degree from Columbia; Chief Justice Rehnquist and O’Connor
attended Stanford; Stevens Northwestern; and Thomas Yale.  See “The Justices of the Supreme
Court” on the United States Supreme Court website, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf.  
177   Re. Stevens, see Findlaw website at http:/conlaw.usatoday.findlaw.com/
supreme_court/justices/stevens.html.
178  Id.  
179  See Judicial Yellow Books 1997 through 2003 (although some information is missing,
the school affiliations of 22 clerks are available and reflected in text).  Justice Scalia relies on a
select group of appellate court judges to vet his clerks.  Over the same period, 1997 to 2003,
Justice Scalia has hired at least seven clerks of Judge Michael Luttig of the Fourth Circuit, three
each from Judges O’Scannlain and Silberman, and two each from Judges Richard Posner and
Sentelle.  See Judicial Yellow Books 1997 through 2003.
rights-oriented and, at least superficially, gay friendly.  But it is a far stretch from this to say that the
law profession has “signed on” to the pro-gay-rights position.  A more fair characterization is that,
despite patches of extreme to mild homophobia, the legal profession may be slightly more tolerant
of gays and lesbians than other identifiable sectors of society.  It would be difficult—though
fascinating—to get more precise than that and to calibrate exactly how gay-friendly the legal
profession is compared to the medical profession, the psychiatric profession, the ministry,
commercial bankers or accountants.  
Scalia is right that the court and its members are deeply embedded in a network of
institutions, social networks, practices and discourses that shape the way that they reason, deliberate
and judge, the way that they write opinions and express themselves, and the way that they reproduce
law clerks and lawyers.   The justices themselves are the product of the elite American legal
academy, sporting law degrees from  Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Columbia, and Northwestern.176
Many of the justices were faculty members at elite law schools before acceding to the bench.  Justice
Scalia, for instance, was a professor at the University of Chicago, and the University of Virginia
before that, and, in that capacity, was himself at least indirectly associated with the American
Association of Law Schools.177  Justice Ginsburg was a law professor at Columbia Law School,
Justice Breyer a professor at Harvard Law School, and Justice Stevens taught as well at
Northwestern and the University of Chicago.178  Their closest employees—their elbow clerks with
whom they spend the most time—are hand-picked from an elite group of top-ranking law students
from the country’s elite law schools. From 1997 through 2003, Justice Scalia has hired at least six
Harvard Law grads, five University of Chicago Law grads, two from Columbia, two from Notre
Dame, and one each from Yale, Stanford, Boalt, NYU, Michigan, Northwestern and Penn.179  Justice
Scalia is certainly not alone.  During the 2001 and 2002 Terms alone, the nine justices hired a
combined total of 17 Harvard law graduates, 11 Yale law graduates, 9 University of Chicago law
graduates, 5 from Columbia, 3 each from Stanford and NYU, and another 21 graduates from an
assortment of elite law schools.  Most of the justices are on speaking circuits that take them
frequently back to law schools, and naturally they socialize with elite Washington D.C. lawyers.
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180  See Jeffrey Rosen, “The Justice Who Came to Dinner,” New York Times, February 1,
2004, Section 4, p. 3 (discussing the exclusive poker game); Legends in Law: A Conversation
with William S. Bennett, D.C. Bar Report, Oct/Nov. 1995) (available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/legends_in_the_law/bennett.cfm).  Regarding the
possible appearance of impropriety, Rosen writes: “Mr. Garment said that during the months he
had a case pending before the court, he stayed away from the game.  He lamented the growing
concern for appearances, and insisted there is nothing wrong with litigants socializing with
justices as long as they don’t discuss pending cases.  ‘If we can’t trust justices to behave
appropriately, and force them to live in a bubble,” Mr. Garment said, ‘we can forget about the
ability of a court appropriately to reflect a changing culture.’” Rosen, “The Justice Who Came to
Dinner,” at p. 3.
181  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 417.
182  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 415.
183  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 416.
184  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 416.
185  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 416.
186  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 8.
187  Confidential discussion with a former Supreme Court law clerk.  
Justice Scalia, for instance, is a regular at what has been called “one of Washington’s most exclusive
poker games,” which includes the Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, and elite D.C. lawyers such as
Robert S. Bennett (the personal attorney to President Bill Clinton and numerous other cabinet
members, such as former defense secretary Casper Weinberger) and Leonard Garment (counselor
to President Richard Nixon).180  
In addition, beginning in the early- to mid-1990s, gay and lesbian law clerks and former law
clerks began coming out to their justices in part as an effort to normalize homosexual relations at the
Supreme Court.  Bill Araiza, law clerk to Justice Souter during the 1991–92 term, reportedly was
committed to coming out to any justice who hired him, wanting to make sure that the justice did not,
reportedly in his own words, “walk away thinking he’s never met a gay person.”181  So, in spring
1992, Araiza told Souter “very bluntly” that he was gay.  Professor Chai Feldblum of Georgetown
University, who clerked for Justice Blackmun during the 1986–87 term, recounts coming out to
Blackmun in 1992, reportedly coaxing herself in the following terms: “Come on, Chai.  You know
he really likes you.  You know it makes a difference when people know someone who’s gay.  You
should do it.”182  According to Murdoch and Price, “Feldblum was one of a number of current and
former gay clerks who by the early 1990s were coming out to justices.”183  Michael Conley and J.
Paul Oetken were openly gay when they clerked for Blackmun in 1990–91 and 1993–94 respectively,
referring openly to their respective partners as “boyfriend” or “partner.”184  In fact, by 1998, Justice
Blackmun included in his list of “office family” members the same-sex partners of Feldblum,
Conley, Oetken and Al Lauber.185  According to Murdoch and Price, “some [gay and/or lesbian
clerks] have taken their partners to court reunions.”186  At least one justice has had a male law clerk
who has had a child in a same-sex relationship and has included the child among the chamber’s
“grand clerks.”187
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188  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 23.
189  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 23.
190  John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 522 (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons).  Laurence Tribe, lead counsel for Michael Hardwick, knew it well, stating that “if I could
convince Powell, I would have five votes and possibly six (O’Connor) but that, if I could not, I
would lose 5-4.” Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 286; see generally id. at 285–89.
191  Whether Powell knew that Chinnis was gay or not is a source of much contention. 
See generally Jeffries, Justice Powell at 521–22; Courting Justice. Powell approached Chinnis
on several occasions to obtain information about homosexuality, despite the fact that the
Hardwick case was assigned to Mosman, see Jeffries, Justice Powell at 521, which suggests that
Powell had, at the very least, a subconscious appreciation that Chinnis may have had some
information in that area.  See Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 272–274.  As some have
suggested, though, it may have been the affinity Powell felt for a fellow Virginian; and the
suspicion that Mosman, a Mormon, might not be well versed on the matters.  See Courting
Justice at 275. Powell’s biographer, John Jeffries asserts that Chinnis’ sexual orientation was
“unknown to Powell.”  Jeffries, Justice Powell at 521.  Given that Powell reportedly told Chinnis
himself, to his face, that “I don’t believe I’ve ever met a homosexual,” Courting Justice at 273,
and told his colleagues in conference on Hardwick that he had never known a homosexual, see
Courting Justice at 308, it is hard to believe that he really knew—was fully conscious—of
Chinnis’ sexual orientation.  See Jeffries, Justice Powell at 528.
192  See generally Jeffries, Justice Powell at 516–521; Courting Justice at 272–277, 292,
Murdoch and Price report that, going back to the mid 1950's, “We found 22 gay former
Supreme Court clerks—18 gay men and four lesbians. . . .  (Another gay man and a lesbian clerked
for appeals court judges who later became justices.)”188 However, practically all of those clerks were
closeted during their clerkships, and the prevalence of closeted gay law clerks does not guarantee
a gay-friendly vote—Justice Powell’s notorious swing vote in Hardwick is testament to that.  As
Murdoch and Price emphasize, “The impact of gay Supreme Court clerks has been very muted until
very recent years because clerks tended to come out only after the justice for whom they’d worked
had left the court.”189   
The role of gay and lesbian clerks—closeted or open—may be offset by the role of more
conservative chamber colleagues.  The Hardwick case is a notorious case study.  Justice Powell was
the swing vote—the fifth vote that would decide the case—and originally voted for Michael
Hardwick.190  That term, Powell had four clerks: Carter Cabell Chinnis Jr., a self-identified gay man
who was in the closet at the time of his clerkship,191 a graduate of Yale Law School, now partner in
a leading law firm, Mayer, Brown, Rowe, and Maw in Washington, D.C.; Michael Mosman, a
conservative Mormon from Idaho, married at the time with three children, a graduate of Brigham
Young University law school, recently appointed by President George W. Bush to the federal district
court in Portland, Oregon; Anne Coughlin, a graduate of New York University School of Law, now
professor of law at the University of Virginia; and William Stuntz, a graduate of the University of
Virginia, now professor at Harvard Law School.192 (Note, the knowledge/power dimensions should
be obvious even to the uninitiated reader).  
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193  See generally website of the Independent Judiciary, a project of the Alliance for
Justice (http://www.independentjudiciary.com/nominees/nominee.cfm?NomineeID=53); “Senate
Confirms Mosman,” The Advocate, September 27, 2003 (available at
http://www.sodomylaws.org/usa/usnews82.htm); 
194  Bench Memorandum dated March 29, 1986, at page 11, in the Powell archives
documents, Bowers file (on file).  
195  Memo at page 12.  
196  Memo at page 11.  See also Jeffries, Justice Powell at 516; Courting Justice at 293.
197  Memo at page 1..
198  This memo is the “Memo to Mike,” dated March 31, 1986, in Powell documents (on
file).  The quote is from Mosman’s response at page 1.  
199  Mosman memo dated April 1, 1986, at page 1.  See also  Jeffries, Justice Powell at
524; Courting Justice at 304.
200  Jeffries, Justice Powell at 520–21; Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 307–308.
201  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 308.
202  Jeffries, Justice Powell at 523; Courting Justice at 312.  
Powell assigned the case to Bill Mosman, his more conservative, Mormon clerk.  Much
controversy surrounds the exact role of Mosman still today.  It was in fact raised during his
confirmation for federal district court in Oregon.193  What is known is that Mosman wrote a 12-page
bench memo for Powell dated March 29, 1986, which Powell received on the Saturday before oral
argument.  In the bench memo, Mosman argued against Hardwick on due process grounds: “The
right to privacy calls for the greatest judicial restraint, invalidating only those laws that impinge on
those values that are basic to our country,” Mosman wrote.194  “I do not think that this case involves
any such values.  I recommend reversal [of the 11th Circuit decision].”195  “Personal sexual freedom
is a newcomer among our national values,” Mosman emphasized, “and may well be, as discussed
earlier, a temporary national mood that fades.”196  On the memo in the Powell archives, a hand-
written note reads: “Well written as usual.  Mike would find no fundamental right.”197  In a memo
received by Powell on April 1, 1986, in response to Powell’s suggestion to Mosman that there may
be room for protection of “homosexual relationships that resemble marriage,”198 Mosman wrote to
Powell: “I think this is not a good approach, for several reasons. . . .   [T]he kind of marriage that our
society has traditionally protected is heterosexual, not homosexual.  It would be bootstrapping to say
that marriage is protected because of our history and tradition, and then add that homosexual
relationships are protected because they ‘resemble’ marriage.”199  
Powell originally voted, in conference after oral argument, to affirm Judge Johnson’s
Eleventh Circuit decision for Hardwick.  He based his decision at the time on the Eighth
Amendment, along the lines of Robinson: it would be cruel and unusual to punish someone for being
gay.200  The opinion writing was assigned to Blackmun by Stevens, with Powell, Brennan and
Marshall in majority.201  By letter dated April 3, 1986, Chief Justice Burger lobbied Powell to change
his vote, declaring that “This case presents for me the most far reaching issue of those 30 years [on
the bench].”202  Whether influenced or not by Burger’s letter, Powell switched his vote pre-draft and
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203  Jeffries, Justice Powell at 525; Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 314.
204  See Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 319.
joined Burger, who now assigned the majority opinion to White.203  Mosman may also have had a
role in convincing Powell to join White’s opinion and minimize his concurrence.204  The extent of
Mosman’s influence on Powell will never be known.  What is clear, though, is that Powell’s actions
were not the product of gay clerks or gay-leaning law schools.  
Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that, by and large, within legal academic and law
profession circles, homosexuality became relatively more tolerated over the decade or decades
preceding Lawrence—or, at the very least, that the centrists on the Supreme Court have become more
gay-friendly.  The decision in Hardwick itself was a close call—closer than we tend to think.  Had
Powell not changed his vote, White’s opinion would have been the dissent.  But Lawrence was much
less of a close call.  From Hardwick to Lawrence, the court composition changed significantly.
Rehnquist, Stevens and O’Connor were the only justices that sat on both cases.  The new justices
included Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  If you stack them up against each
other, substituting relatively comparable political ideologies on homosexual sodomy, the game card
would look something like the following [editor: we need to make this look better]:
Hardwick
pro-gay
Lawrence
pro-gay
Hardwick
pro-state
Lawrence
pro-state
Stevens Stevens Rehnquist Rehnquist
Blackmun Souter Burger Scalia
Brennan Ginsburg White Thomas
Marshall Breyer
O’Connor
(EPC)
O’Connor
(DP)
Kennedy Powell
Hardwick may have been a close call, but Lawrence, it turns out, was not: a strong five-
person majority with a change in vote by Justice O’Connor (on other grounds).  The additional votes
of Kennedy and Souter —liberal replacements on this issue — made all the difference.  If you
eliminate the extremes at both ends of the political spectrum—Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Ginsburg
and Breyer at one end, and Rehnquist, Burger, White, Scalia and Thomas at the other— then the
court’s center has moved to the left on gay-rights issues.  It was composed of Blackmun, O’Connor
and Powell in Hardwick.  It is now composed of O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter—clearly a more
gay-friendly center court.   
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205  Murdoch and Price, Courting Justice at 253.
206  Lisa Duggan and Nan D. Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture, 80
(New York: Routledge 1995).  This is a common–rightly so–refrain in the queer literature, not
just the liberal pro-gay-rights literature.  See e.g. Mary Bernstein, “Gender, queer Family
Policies, and the Limits of Law,” 421, in Queer Families, Queer Politics: Challenging Culture
and the State, ed. Mary Bernstein and Renate Reimann (New York: Columbia University Press
2001) (“the sodomy statutes continue to be used to justify denying employment to lesbians and
gay men, removing children from lesbian mothers, and a host of other injustices.  Although few
people are actually arrested under the sodomy statutes, the collateral damage remains great”).
None of this is to suggest that the legal profession or the court is overly sensitive to gay
issues.  To the contrary, at every turn there are significant disadvantages in terms of contacts and
opportunities.  Justice Scalia, after all, isn’t going duck hunting with Evan Wolfson, director of the
marriage project at Lambda.  And there are recurring incidents of homophobia and prejudice.  This
is still a court that is lead by a chief justice who, in 1978, “publicly compared homosexuality to a
contagious disease requiring a quarantine.”205  But still, it is an institutional and practice milieu that
has come to some form of negotiated existence that tolerates and in some cases affirmatively protects
the interests of gay men and lesbian women more than other social networks.    
Justice Scalia’s last point—that the six-member majority in Lawrence largely signs on to the
liberal pro-gay-rights agenda, defined as the project to eliminate the moral opprobrium attached to
homosexual practices—requires the most reworking.  On the surface, it is right.  The
Lawrence decision is gay-friendly. Spending the night in jail and leaving the station house with a
criminal arrest for a consensual intimate act is, from a gay-friendly perspective, abhorrent.  Insofar
as the criminal law shapes the society that we live in and distributes status, power, and wealth, the
Lawrence decision helps to neutralize material harms to gay men and lesbian women.  The
consequences of criminalization and marginalization are material: homosexual partners may not get
health benefits, testamentary succession rights, or an opportunity to adopt the child they are raising.
As Nan Hunter emphasizes, “Sodomy laws have functioned as the lynchpin for denial of
employment, housing and custody or visitation rights; even when we have proved that there was no
nexus between homosexuality and job skills or parenting ability, we have had the courts throw the
‘habitual criminal’ label at us as a reason to deny relief.”206  
In this sense, gay men and lesbian women won a major battle.  But in order to understand
how Lawrence happened and what it tells us about future sex wars, it is critical to dispense with the
notion of a “homosexual agenda” and to explore, instead, the proliferation of sexual projects in
contemporary society, to examine the surprising alliances that form on sex matters, and to reconsider
all the different interests at stake.  This may lead us, in the process, to revisit exactly who won and
who lost in Lawrence—dark side and all.  
IV.
In the end, the politics of spleen may be fundamentally unstable in the criminal law context.
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207  In all my extensive research, I have not identified one academic or activist willing to
advance the gay-friendly categorical opposition to Lawrence.  This fragmented sexual project
appears to be a null set.  
208  Thomas Grey, “Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court,” 43 Law and Contemporary
Problems 83, 97 (1980).  Thanks to Mary Anne Case for pointing me to this wonderful article.   
Maybe the penal sanction, punishment, and state coercion change everything.  After all, who in their
right mind would want to live in fear of criminal prosecution?  And even if they did, how on earth
would they justify imposing that fear on others?  That would be utterly deviant.  Perhaps the politics
of spleen, in reality, are nothing more than a coping mechanism—a way of making the best of a
terrible situation.  The Warsaw ghetto, some might say, may also have had positive, constitutive
effects—so what?  Or maybe the politics of spleen, by definition, simply cannot willingly embrace
the prohibition.  It may be internally incoherent to choose criminalization, to will the oppression:
the transgressive impulse may not allow for the prohibition norm to be self-inflicted.  In this sense,
the politics of spleen may be unspeakable—and for that reason, unspoken.207
But this leaves a nagging sense that the discourse of equality, of justice, of non-
discrimination against gay men and lesbian women serves to render more palatable a gradual
extension of the traditional heterosexual-marriage model.  The surface discourse on Lawrence is that
gays were repressed, coerced, punished for their sexual orientation, and that the larger society has
now liberated gays from the oppression of the homophobic state sanction.  The question is, has
society really instead simply made the world safe for the heterosexual-married-with-children model?
Under the cover of a discourse of justice, have we not reshaped our institutions and practices in a
hetero-mono mold?  Instead of liberating homosexual relations, perhaps the law has figured out a
better way to administer, to manage, to shape gays.  Thomas Grey points in this direction in his
marvelous essay, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court: “For [the gay community] to be governed
effectively, it must be recognized as legitimate.  Perhaps something like marriage will have to be
recognized for homosexual couples, not because THEY need it for their happiness (though they
may), but because SOCIETY needs it to avoid the insecurity and instability generated by the
existence in its midst of a permanent and influential subculture outside the law.”208  Could that
possibly be right?  Some part of it?  Some fraction?  It is hard to know.  What is clear, though, is that
if it is right, then we do need to probe further, to dig deeper, to explore again the politics of spleen.
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